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A PREFERRED-HABITAT MODEL OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES1
Dimitri Vayanos and Jean-Luc Vila
We model the term structure of interest rates that results from the interaction be-
tween investors with preferences for specific maturities and risk-averse arbitrageurs.
Shocks to the short rate are transmitted to long rates through arbitrageurs’ carry
trades. Arbitrageurs earn rents from transmitting the shocks, through bond risk pre-
mia that relate positively to the slope of the term structure. When the short rate
is the only risk factor, changes in investor demand have the same relative effect on
interest rates across maturities regardless of the maturities where they originate.
When investor demand is also stochastic, demand effects become more localized. A
calibration indicates that long rates under-react severely to forward-guidance an-
nouncements about short rates. Large-scale asset purchases can be more effective in
moving long rates, especially if they are concentrated at long maturities.
Keywords: Interest rates, bond risk premia, limited arbitrage, government debt,
monetary policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
What determines the term structure of interest rates? In most macro-finance models, the interest rate for
a given maturity depends on the willingness of a representative agent to substitute consumption from today
towards that maturity. The consumption-based view of the term structure contrasts with a more informal
preferred-habitat view, which has been proposed by Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966), and
is popular within central banks and the financial industry. According to that view, there are investor clienteles
for specific maturity segments, and the interest rate for a given maturity is mainly driven by shocks affecting
the demand of the corresponding clientele. The term structure thus exhibits a degree of segmentation.
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The preferred-habitat view has been used to interpret numerous market episodes. The 2004 U.K. pension
reform is one example. The reform required pension funds to evaluate their pension liabilities using the yields
of long-maturity bonds. To hedge against drops in long rates, which would raise the value of pension liabilities
and trigger regulatory scrutiny, pension funds bought long-maturity bonds in large quantities. This drove long
rates to record low levels. A flat term structure in early 2004 became downward-sloping in subsequent years,
with the 30-year bond yielding as much as 0.80% (80 basis points, bps) below its 10-year counterpart.1 More
recently, the preferred-habitat view informed decisions by major central banks to engage in Quantitative
Easing (QE). A stated goal of QE programmes was that large-scale purchases of long-maturity bonds would
drive long rates down, stimulating corporate investment.2
The preferred-habitat view cannot be correct in its most extreme form, namely, the interest rate for a given
maturity cannot be driven only by shocks affecting the demand of the corresponding clientele. Indeed, if that
were the case, interest rates for nearby maturities could be very different, generating large profits for term-
structure arbitrageurs. At the same time, shocks to clientele demands can affect interest rates. Indeed, because
absorbing the shocks exposes arbitrageurs to interest-rate risk, bond prices must change to compensate them
for the risk.
How do shocks to clientele demands affect the term structure? What are the effects of large-scale bond
purchases by central banks? What are the implications of the preferred-habitat view for the dynamics of
interest rates, for bond risk premia, and for the transmission of monetary policy from short to long rates?
In this paper we develop a model to answer these questions both qualitatively as well as quantitatively
through a calibration exercise. Our model formalizes the preferred-habitat view and embeds it into a modern
no-arbitrage term-structure framework.
We describe our model in Section 2. The short rate follows an exogenous mean-reverting process. An
exogenous short rate can be interpreted as the return of a linear and instantaneously riskless production
technology, or as the instantaneous rate that a (non-modelled) central bank pays on reserves. Bond yields are
determined endogenously through trading between preferred-habitat investors and arbitrageurs. Preferred-
habitat investors demand zero-coupon bonds with specific maturities, and their demand can be price-elastic.
We provide an optimizing foundation for that demand in a setting where investors form overlapping gener-
1For accounts of the 2004 U.K. pension reform and other related episodes, see Tzucker and Islam (2005), Garbade and
Rutherford (2007), Islam (2007), and Greenwood and Vayanos (2010).
2See, for example, the 2011 speeches on large-scale asset purchases by Janet Yellen, the then Vice-Chair of the U.S. Federal
Reserve (Yellen (2011)), and John Williams, the then President of the San Francisco Fed (Wiliams (2011)).
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ations consuming at the end of their life, are infinitely risk averse, and can invest in bonds and in a private
opportunity with exogenous return (e.g., real estate). Arbitrageurs are competitive and maximize a mean-
variance objective over instantaneous changes in wealth. We fix their aggregate risk aversion and do not study
entry into the arbitrage business.
In Section 3 we solve for equilibrium when the demand of preferred-habitat investors is constant over time
and the only risk factor is the short rate. We address three main questions: how shocks to the short rate
are transmitted to long rates, how bond risk premia depend on the shape of the term structure, and how
changes in preferred-habitat demand affect the term structure. Since demand is constant over time, we take
the changes to be unanticipated and permanent.
Shocks to the short rate are transmitted to bond yields through the trades of arbitrageurs. Suppose that
the short rate drops. Since investing in bonds becomes more attractive than investing in the short rate,
arbitrageurs buy bonds by borrowing short-term. That trade causes bond prices to rise and yields to drop.
Because, however, arbitrageurs become exposed to the risk that the short rate will increase, they do not
scale up their trade to the point where it earns zero expected profit. Hence, the drop in yields does not
fully reflect the drop in the short rate, which means that forward rates under-react to expected future short
rates. The under-reaction disappears when arbitrageurs are risk-neutral, or when preferred-habitat demand
is price-inelastic since in that case arbitrageurs cause bond prices to rise without actually buying the bonds.
Bond risk premia (expected returns in excess of the short rate) are positively related to the slope of the
term structure, consistent with the empirical findings of Fama and Bliss (FB 1987) and Campbell and Shiller
(CS 1991). When the short rate is low, the term structure slopes up, and bonds earn positive risk premia so
that arbitrageurs are induced to buy them. The risk premia accrue to arbitrageurs as a rent for transmitting
short-rate shocks to long rates. Monetary-policy actions by central banks affecting the short rate can hence
be viewed as a source of arbitrageur rent.3 That rent is higher when arbitrageurs are more risk-averse and
when preferred-habitat demand is more price-elastic.
When the short rate is the only risk factor, changes in preferred-habitat demand have global effects: the
effects depend on how the arbitrageurs’ overall exposure to the short rate (“duration risk”) changes, and
not on the specific maturities where the demand changes originate. To illustrate this result’s surprising
implications, suppose that the demand for short-maturity bonds increases and the demand for long-maturity
bonds decreases by the same amount in present-value terms. Since arbitrageurs buy long-maturity bonds,
3We thank John Cochrane for suggesting this idea (Cochrane (2008)).
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and these are more sensitive to short-rate changes than short-maturity bonds, all yields rise—including those
of short-maturity bonds for which demand increases. The same logic implies that all demand changes have
the same relative effect across maturities regardless of where they originate. Moreover, the effect is largest at
the longest maturity. Indeed, since the longest-maturity bonds are the most sensitive to short-rate changes,
their risk premia are also the most sensitive to changes in the arbitrageurs’ exposure to the short rate.
In Section 4 we allow the demand of preferred-habitat investors to vary over time. We maintain a stochastic
short rate; with a constant short rate, arbitrageur activity would render all yields equal to the short rate.
We mainly focus on the case where demand has a one-factor structure and that factor is independent of the
short rate, but we also consider multiple demand factors and correlation. Within the two-factor model, we
revisit the same three questions as in Section 3.
Demand risk weakens and can even reverse the transmission of short-rate shocks to long rates. Suppose
that the short rate drops, in which case arbitrageurs buy bonds. Arbitrageurs become exposed to the risk that
the short rate will increase and that preferred-habitat demand will decrease. Because demand risk becomes
dominant for long-maturity bonds, arbitrageurs buy them in small quantities and may even sell them short
to hedge the demand risk of their long positions in intermediate maturities. Long-maturity yields may thus
rise in response to a short-rate drop.
Demand risk strengthens the positive relationship between bond risk premia and term-structure slope.
Indeed, when preferred-habitat demand is low, risk premia are high so that arbitrageurs are induced to buy
bonds to make up for the low demand. Because of the high premia, yields are high and the term structure
slopes up. As a result of the stronger premia-slope relationship, the model-generated coefficients in the FB
and CS regressions have properties closer to their empirical counterparts. For example, the FB coefficient can
be larger than one and increasing with maturity, rather than only positive and constant as in the one-factor
model.
With multiple risk factors, demand effects become more localized. Changes in the demand for short- (long-)
maturity bonds have more pronounced effects on short- (long-) maturity yields. As in the one-factor model,
the effects arise through the arbitrageurs’ exposure to the risk factors. They become more localized because
demand changes originating at different maturities affect the exposure to each factor differently, and because
changes in each factor exposure have a different relative effect across maturities.
In Section 5 we calibrate the two-factor model and analyze central-bank policies such as forward guidance
and QE. We choose the model parameters to match the volatility of U.S. government bond yields and yield
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changes, the correlation between yield changes at the short and the long end of the term structure, and the
composition of bond trading volume across maturities. Since the model can be given both a nominal and a
real interpretation, we calibrate it using nominal yields and then again using real yields. The nominal and
real calibrations generate remarkably similar results.
Forward guidance about short rates is effective in moving yields of short-maturity bonds, but becomes less
effective for long maturities. Lowering the average expected short rate over the next ten years by 100 bps (and
holding preferred-habitat demand constant) causes the ten-year yield to drop by 35-50 bps. The same change
to the expected short rate over thirty years has almost no effect on the thirty-year yield. QE can be more
effective in changing long rates, provided that bond purchases are concentrated at long maturities. Purchases
amounting to 12% of GDP and conforming to the maturity distribution used by the Fed during QE1 lower the
ten-year yield by 25-30bps and the thirty-year yield by 30-35bps. Tilting purchases towards long maturities,
while keeping the fraction of available supply purchased in each maturity bucket within observed ceilings,
increases the effects by 10 and 30bps, respectively. These effects are sensitive to arbitrageur risk aversion; a
spike in risk aversion during a crisis would result in larger effects.
Our model formalizes the preferred-habitat theory of the term structure, proposed by Culbertson (1957)
and Modigliani and Sutch (1966). Related to preferred habitat is Tobin’s (1958,1969) portfolio-balance theory,
in which financial assets are imperfect substitutes, and investors require a rise in interest rates to absorb an
increased supply of government bonds. The portfolio-balance channel is present in our model, with Tobin’s
investors being our arbitrageurs. It is the only channel present in the special case of our model where preferred-
habitat demand is price-inelastic.
Andres, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2004) study demand effects and the portfolio-balance channel in a cali-
brated macroeconomic model with trading frictions. Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) use our model’s special
case with a price-inelastic demand to test for a positive relationship between the maturity of government debt
and future bond returns. Other empirical studies of demand effects in the bond market that build on our
model include Hamilton and Wu (2012) and Li and Wei (2013) on QE purchases and the zero lower bound
(ZLB);4 Hanson (2014) and Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter (2016) on mortgage-backed securities;
Gorodnichenko and Ray (2018) on Treasury auctions; Kaminska and Zinna (2019) on purchases by foreign
4For empirical estimates of the effects of QE, see also Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011), Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and
Tong (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Swanson (2011), Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), D’Amico and
King (2013), Swanson and Williams (2014), and the survey by Wiliams (2014). Some of these papers emphasize the duration-risk
channel. That channel describes demand effects in the one-factor version of our model but not with multiple factors.
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central banks; and King (2019) on non-linearities induced by the ZLB. Hayashi (2018) develops numerical
algorithms to solve our model with a general number of risk factors.
The notion that demand shocks can drive asset prices away from fundamental values is emphasized in
the literature on the limits of arbitrage, surveyed in Gromb and Vayanos (2010). Closest to our paper is the
strand of the literature on price distortions across an asset class. See, for example, Barberis and Shleifer (2003)
and Vayanos and Woolley (2013) on style investing, momentum and reversal; Greenwood (2005) and Hau
(2011) on index redefinitions; Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) on mortgage-backed securities;
Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) on options; and Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) on foreign exchange.
Preferred habitats in our model concern maturities. They could alternatively concern bonds that differ
in liquidity or in the type of issuer, e.g., government versus corporate. Preferences for liquidity have been
used to explain the on-the-run phenomenon, whereby just-issued government bonds are more expensive
than previously-issued bonds maturing on nearby dates.5 Preferences for government bonds could be arising
because of those bonds’ safety and wider acceptability as collateral. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012) provide evidence consistent with the existence of an investor clientele pricing those attributes.
Our model belongs to the class of affine no-arbitrage term-structure models (Duffie and Kan (1996)) because
yields are affine in the risk factors. Dai and Singleton (2002) and Duffee (2002) develop models within that
class that embody the positive relationship between bond risk premia and term-structure slope. We derive
such a relationship in an equilibrium model.6 Our model can address questions that reduced-form models
cannot such as how demand shocks affect the term structure and how the effects depend on arbitrageur risk
aversion and investor price-elasticity.
2. MODEL
Time is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. The term structure at time t consists of a continuum
of zero-coupon government bonds. The maturities of the bonds lie in the interval (0,∞). Assuming that the
interval of bond maturities is infinite is without loss of generality because we can specify preferred-habitat
demand to be zero for bonds with sufficiently long maturities. The bond with maturity τ has face value one,
5For evidence on the on-the-run phenomenon, see Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Warga (1992) and Krishnamurthy (2002).
For theoretical explanations, see Duffie (1996), Vayanos and Weill (2008) and Banerjee and Graveline (2013).
6Other equilibrium models that generate a positive premia-slope relationship include Wachter (2006), Buraschi and Jiltsov
(2007) and Lettau and Wachter (2011) who assume habit formation; Xiong and Yan (2010) who assume heterogeneous beliefs;
and Gabaix (2012) who assumes rare disasters with time-varying severity.
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hence paying one unit of the numeraire at time t + τ . We denote by P
(τ)
t and y
(τ)
t , respectively the time-t
price and yield of the bond with maturity τ . The yield is the spot rate for maturity τ , and is related to the
price through
(1) y
(τ)
t = −
log(P
(τ)
t )
τ
.
We denote by f
(τ−∆τ,τ)
t the time-t forward rate between maturities τ −∆τ and τ . The forward rate is related
to the price through
(2) f
(τ−∆τ,τ)
t = −
log
(
P
(τ)
t
P
(τ−∆τ)
t
)
∆τ
.
The short rate rt is the limit of the yield y
(τ)
t when τ goes to zero. We take rt as exogenous, and describe
its dynamics later in this section (Equation (7)). An exogenous rt can be interpreted as the return of a linear
and instantaneously riskless production technology. Alternatively, rt can be determined by the central bank
in response to exogenous shocks. We sketch the central-bank interpretation in Section 3.3, where we derive
some of our model’s implications for monetary policy.
Agents are of two types: arbitrageurs and preferred-habitat investors. Arbitrageurs can invest in the bonds
and in the short rate. We denote their time-t wealth by Wt and their time-t position, expressed in present-
value terms, in the bonds with maturities in [τ, τ + dτ ] by X
(τ)
t dτ . The arbitrageurs’ budget constraint is
(3) dWt =
(
Wt −
∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t dτ
)
rtdt+
∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t
dP
(τ)
t
P
(τ)
t
dτ,
where the instantaneous change dP
(τ)
t is computed by changing the time subscript t to t+dt and the maturity
superscript τ to τ − dt.7 Arbitrageurs maximize a mean-variance objective over instantaneous changes in
wealth. Their optimization problem is
(4) max
{X(τ)t }τ∈(0,∞)
[
Et(dWt)− a
2
Vart(dWt)
]
,
7Implicit in our notation is that the arbitrageurs’ position in the bonds with maturities in [τ, τ+dτ ] is of order dτ . Arbitrageurs
hold such a position in equilibrium because preferred-habitat demand for the bonds with maturities in [τ, τ + dτ ] is assumed to
be of order dτ .
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where a ≥ 0 is a risk-aversion coefficient that characterizes the trade-off between mean and variance. Arbi-
trageurs with the objective (4) can be interpreted as overlapping generations living over infinitesimal periods.
The generation born at time t is endowed with wealth W , invests from t to t + dt, consumes at t + dt and
then dies. If preferences over consumption are described by the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility
function U , and if all uncertainty is Brownian as is the case in equilibrium, utility maximization yields the
objective (4) with the risk-aversion coefficient a = −U ′′(W )U ′(W ) .
Preferred-habitat investors have preferences for specific maturities. For example, pension funds prefer long-
maturity bonds because their duration matches that of pension liabilities. Insurance companies likewise
prefer long- and intermediate-maturity bonds because their duration matches that of liabilities associated to
retirement and insurance products that they offer. At the other end of the maturity spectrum, money-market
funds are required by their mandates to hold short-maturity bonds. We model the demand of preferred-habitat
investors in reduced form and provide an optimizing foundation in Appendix B.
Investors’ maturity habitats cover the interval (0,∞), and investors with habitats in [τ, τ + dτ ] are in
measure dτ . Investors with habitat τ at time t hold a position
(5) Z
(τ)
t = −α(τ) log(P (τ)t )− β(τ)t ,
expressed in present-value terms, in the bond with maturity τ and hold no other bonds. Equation (5) is a
demand function linear and decreasing in the logarithm of the bond price. The slope coefficient α(τ) ≥ 0 is
constant over time but can depend on maturity τ . The intercept coefficient β
(τ)
t can depend on both t and
τ . For simplicity, we refer to α(τ) and β
(τ)
t as demand slope and demand intercept, respectively. The actual
intercept is −β(τ)t . By setting α(τ) = β(τ)t = 0 for τ larger than a finite threshold T , we can take the interval
of bond maturities to be finite and equal to (0, T ).
The demand intercept β
(τ)
t takes the form
(6) β
(τ)
t = θ0(τ) +
K∑
k=1
θk(τ)βk,t,
where {θk(τ)}k=0,..,K are constant over time but can depend on maturity τ , and {βk,t}k=1,..,K are time-
varying but independent of τ . We refer to {βk,t}k=1,..,K as demand risk factors. The functions {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K
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characterize the maturities where demand changes originate. If, for example, θk(τ) is independent of τ , then a
change in βk,t impacts demand for all maturities equally, and can be interpreted as a global demand shock. If
instead θk(τ) peaks at a specific maturity, then a change in βk,t impacts demand for that maturity the most,
and can be interpreted as a local demand shock. To ensure that integrals involving (α(τ), {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K) are
well-defined, we assume that either (i) (α(τ), {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K) become zero for τ larger than a finite threshold
T , are are continuous in (0, T ], or (ii) (α(τ), {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K) converge to zero at exponential rates when τ
goes to infinity, with the rates for {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K not exceeding that for α(τ), and are continuous in (0,∞).
The (K + 1)× 1 vector qt ≡ (rt, β1,t, .., βK,t)> follows the process
(7) dqt = −Γ(qt − rE)dt+ ΣdBt,
where r is a constant, E is the (K+ 1)× 1 vector (1, 0, .., 0)>, (Γ,Σ) are constant (K+ 1)× (K+ 1) matrices,
dBt is a (K + 1) × 1 vector (dBr,t, dBβ,1,t, .., dBβ,K,t)> of independent Brownian motions, and > denotes
transpose. Equation (7) nests the case where the short rate rt and the K demand factors {βk,t}k=1,..,K are
mutually independent, and the case where they are correlated. Independence arises when the matrices (Γ,Σ)
are diagonal. When instead Σ is non-diagonal, shocks to the factors rt and {βk,t}k=1,..,K are correlated, and
when Γ is non-diagonal, the drift (instantaneous expected change) of each factor depends on all other factors.
We assume that the eigenvalues of Γ have negative real parts. Hence, qt is stationary, and (7) implies that the
long-run means of rt and {βk,t}k=1,..,K are r and zero, respectively. Setting the long-run mean of {βk,t}k=1,..,K
to zero is without loss of generality since we can redefine the function θ0(τ) to include a non-zero long-run
mean.
We assume that government bonds are in zero supply. This is without loss of generality because we can
redefine the demand function (5) as a net demand: the demand by preferred-habitat investors for the bond
with maturity τ , net of the government supply of that bond.
Under the assumed demand function (5), the demand by preferred-habitat investors for the bond with
maturity τ depends only on that bond’s price and not on the prices of other bonds. This begs the question
why rational investors buy the bond with maturity τ if a bond with maturity close to τ is much cheaper.
Appendix B shows that the demand function (5), together with the specification (6) and (7) for the demand
intercept β
(τ)
t , can be given an optimizing foundation when bond maturities belong to a finite interval (0, T )
and the matrix Σ has full rank. The optimizing foundation requires that the term structure satisfies no-
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arbitrage, which is the case for the equilibrium derived in Sections 3 and 4.
The preferred-habitat investors in Appendix B form overlapping generations living over a period equal
to the maximum bond maturity T . The generation born at time t consumes only at t + T and then dies.
Investors are infinitely risk-averse over consumption. They derive consumption by investing in bonds and
in a private opportunity whose return at time t′ ≥ t is exogenous and increasing in β(T+t−t′)t . Infinite risk
aversion ensures that investors’ optimal bond portfolio yields a riskless payoff at the time t + T when they
consume. That portfolio consists only of the bond maturing at t + T . No-arbitrage ensures that investors
cannot achieve a higher payoff with certainty by investing in bonds with maturities other than t + T : if the
payoff is higher with positive probability, then it must also be lower with positive probability.
The elasticity of preferred-habitat demand in Appendix B arises because investors substitute between the
bond that matures at the time t + T when they consume, and the private opportunity. When the bond’s
price decreases, the bond’s return from t to t + T increases. Hence, the bond becomes more attractive
relative to the private opportunity, and bond demand increases.8 Conversely, when the return on the private
opportunity increases, it becomes more attractive relative to the bond, and bond demand decreases. The
private opportunity could represent, for example, an investment in real estate.9
Stepping outside of the optimizing foundation in Appendix B, β
(τ)
t could vary because of shocks to the
supply of bonds issued by the government and shocks to the composition of the preferred-habitat investor
pool. The demand specification (5)-(7) can capture these shocks if the maturities affected by the shocks
remain fixed as time passes. Suppose, for example, that there is a sudden increase at time t in the demand
for the bond with maturity τ . The specification (5)-(7) requires that this increase translates to an increase
at time t+ 1 in the demand for the bond with maturity τ rather than τ − 1. That is, the shock does not “roll
down” over time in the maturity space.
Some shocks roll down in the maturity space. For example, an increase at time t in the government supply
of the bond with maturity τ translates to an increase at time t+ 1 in the supply of the bond with maturity
τ − 1 rather than τ . For such shocks, the specification (5)-(7) can be viewed as an approximation. Modifying
that specification to allow roll down would render the analysis more complicated because bond demand at
8Since investors in Appendix B choose their portfolio based on its return at the time t+T when they consume, their demand
for the bond that matures at t+ T depends on the bond’s return to maturity rather than on the return over the next instant.
9An example of preferred-habitat investors substituting from government bonds into real estate comes from the UK’s pension
reform of 2004, mentioned in the Introduction. The drop in long rates induced pension funds to substitute towards non-bond
investments, including real estate. For example, Marks & Spencer arranged for their pension fund to receive payments based on
the leases of their property portfolio (Islam (2007), p.61).
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time t would depend on the entire history of shocks up to time t−T . (The shocks up to time t−T + τ would
affect demand for bonds with maturities up to τ .)
Our model makes a stark distinction between arbitrageurs, who can substitute across maturities, and
preferred-habitat investors, who invest only in their maturity habitat. Suppressing this distinction (by making
the risk aversion of preferred-habitat investors finite in Appendix B), would complicate the model without
changing the basic mechanisms. Preferred-habitat investors would substitute across maturities, acting partly
as arbitrageurs, and arbitrage capacity would increase. The analysis would become more complicated because
it would involve a continuum of portfolios rather than only the portfolio of arbitrageurs.
An additional distinction between arbitrageurs and preferred-habitat investors, which is implicit in the
demand specification (5) and explicit in the optimizing foundation in Appendix B, is that the latter can
access investment opportunities outside of the bond market while the former cannot. If arbitrageurs could
access investment opportunities outside the government bond market, then shocks to the returns of their
opportunities would affect bond prices as well. We suppress that effect by assuming that arbitrageurs specialize
in trading only government bonds.
Our model can be given both a nominal and a real interpretation. Under the nominal interpretation, the
numeraire is money, arbitrageurs’ preferences concern their wealth evaluated in nominal terms, and prefer-
ences of preferred-habitat investors (in the optimizing foundation in Appendix B) concern their consumption
in nominal terms. Under the real interpretation, the numeraire consists of goods, and preferences concern
wealth and consumption in real terms. A short rate determined by the central bank fits better the nominal
interpretation, while a short rate determined by a production technology fits better the real interpretation.
The arbitrageurs’ optimization problem yields the same solution regardless of whether preferences concern
nominal or real wealth. This is because the arbitrageurs’ objective involves changes in wealth over an infinites-
imal interval, during which inflation is constant.10 Hence, the assumption under the nominal interpretation
that arbitrageurs’ preferences concern nominal wealth is innocuous.
Whether preferences concern nominal or real consumption matters for preferred-habitat investors, who have
a longer horizon. Preferences over nominal consumption describe, for example, life-insurance companies that
offer insurance or retirement products with guaranteed minimum returns typically not indexed to inflation.11
10Denoting by dWt = Wt+dt − Wt the instantaneous change in arbitrageur nominal wealth, the change in real wealth is
dWRt =
Wt+dt
1+pitdt
−Wt = dWt −Wtpitdt, where pit is inflation between t and t+ dt. Since Et(dWRt )− a2Vart(dWRt ) = Et(dWt)−
a
2
Vart(dWt)− pitdt, maximizing Et(dWRt )− a2Vart(dWRt ) yields the same solution as maximizing Et(dWt)− a2Vart(dWt).
11For a description of the products offered by life-insurance companies see, for example, Berends, McMenamin, Plestis, and
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Preferences over real consumption describe, for example, pension funds that offer pensions rising with, or
explicitly indexed to, inflation.12 Payouts from property and casualty insurance rise with inflation as well.
Hence, both nominal and real preferred habitats arise in practice.
Under the nominal interpretation, inflation could affect both the short rate and the intercept β
(τ)
t of
preferred-habitat demand. Indeed, high inflation could be associated with high nominal returns throughout
the economy, and hence with both a high nominal short rate and a high nominal return β
(τ)
t on investment
opportunities other than government bonds. Inflation could thus generate a positive correlation between the
short rate and the demand factors. Because of that correlation, inflation could have only a weak effect on
bond demand by preferred-habitat investors: high bond yields raise demand, and high β
(τ)
t lowers it.
3. NO DEMAND RISK
In this section we study the case where there are no demand risk factors (K = 0). Time-variation in yields
arises because of the short rate rt, which is the only risk factor. For K = 0, (7) reduces to
(8) drt = κr(r − rt)dt+ σrdBr,t,
where κr ≡ Γ1,1 > 0 and σr ≡ Σ1,1.
3.1. Equilibrium without Arbitrageurs
We first derive, as a benchmark, the equilibrium that would prevail in the arbitrageurs’ absence. We refer
to it as the segmentation equilibrium because the yield for each maturity is determined solely by the demand
of the investors with that maturity habitat. The yield y
(τ)
t for maturity τ is determined by setting the net
demand (5) by preferred-habitat investors to zero. Since (1) implies log(P
(τ)
t ) = −τy(τ)t , y(τ)t is given by
(9) y
(τ)
t =
β
(τ)
t
α(τ)τ
=
θ0(τ)
α(τ)τ
,
Rosen (2013) and Sen (2019). Table 1 of Berends, McMenamin, Plestis, and Rosen (2013) indicates that guaranteed minimum
returns not indexed to inflation are a common feature of life-insurance products.
12Indexation of pensions to inflation was accounted for in the 2004 U.K. pension reform, which required pension funds to
evaluate their pension liabilities using the yields of long-maturity inflation-indexed bonds.
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where the second equality follows by setting K = 0 in (6). The yield y
(τ)
t for maturity τ is constant over time
and is disconnected from the time-varying short rate rt. It depends only on the demand intercept β
(τ)
t = θ0(τ)
and demand slope α(τ) for maturity τ . An increase in θ0(τ) lowers the demand by preferred-habitat investors
for the bond with maturity τ , and hence raises y
(τ)
t . The effect is weaker the larger α(τ) is because the
demand by preferred-habitat investors is more price-elastic. The segmentation equilibrium corresponds to an
extreme form of the preferred-habitat view (Culbertson (1957), Modigliani and Sutch (1966)).
3.2. Equilibrium with Arbitrageurs
We next derive the equilibrium when arbitrageurs are present. We proceed in three steps: (i) conjecture a
functional form for equilibrium yields, (ii) derive the arbitrageurs’ first-order condition given the conjectured
yields, and (iii) combine the arbitrageurs’ first-order condition with market clearing, and confirm that yields
are as conjectured.
We conjecture that equilibrium yields are affine in the single risk factor rt. That is, there exist two functions
(Ar(τ), C(τ)) that depend only on τ such that the time-t price of the bond with maturity τ is
(10) P
(τ)
t = e
−[Ar(τ)rt+C(τ)].
Applying Ito’s Lemma to (10), recalling that dP
(τ)
t is computed by changing the time subscript t to t+dt and
the maturity superscript τ to τ − dt, and using the dynamics (8) of rt, we find that the time-t instantaneous
return on the bond with maturity τ is
(11)
dP
(τ)
t
P
(τ)
t
= µ
(τ)
t dt−Ar(τ)σrdBr,t,
where
(12) µ
(τ)
t ≡ A′r(τ)rt + C ′(τ)−Ar(τ)κr(r − rt) +
1
2
Ar(τ)
2σ2r
is the instantaneous expected return.
To derive the arbitrageurs’ first-order condition, we substitute the bond return (11) into the the arbi-
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trageurs’ budget constraint (3) and optimization problem (4). This yields
dWt =
[
Wtrt +
∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t (µ
(τ)
t − rt)dτ
]
dt−
[∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t Ar(τ)dτ
]
σrdBr,t
and
(13) max
{X(τ)t }τ∈(0,∞)
{∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t (µ
(τ)
t − rt)dτ −
aσ2r
2
[∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t Ar(τ)dτ
]2}
,
respectively. Point-wise maximization of (13) yields the arbitrageurs’ first-order condition.
Lemma 1 The arbitrageurs’ first-order condition is
(14) µ
(τ)
t − rt = −Ar(τ)λr,t,
where
(15) λr,t ≡ −aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t Ar(τ)dτ.
The arbitrageurs’ first-order condition (14) balances risk and return. The left-hand side is the increase in
the expected return on the arbitrageurs’ portfolio if they shift one unit of the numeraire from the short rate
rt to the bond with maturity τ . Portfolio expected return increases by the difference between the bond’s
expected return µ
(τ)
t and the short rate rt. The right-hand side is the increase in the risk of the arbitrageurs’
portfolio, times the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coefficient a. Portfolio risk increases by the covariance between
the return on the additional investment in the bond and the return on the portfolio. With only one risk factor,
the covariance is the product of the sensitivities of the two returns to the factor, times the factor’s variance.
The risk factor is the short rate, and its variance is σ2r . Moreover, (11) implies that the sensitivity of the
bond’s return to the short rate is −Ar(τ), and the sensitivity of the portfolio’s return is −
∫∞
0
X
(τ)
t Ar(τ)dτ .
The first-order condition (14) can alternatively be interpreted in the context of no-arbitrage models of
the term structure.13 No-arbitrage in continuous time requires that there exist prices specific to each risk
13See, for example, Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) for early contributions, and Veronesi (2010) for a
textbook treatment.
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factor and common across assets, such that the expected return of any asset in excess of the short rate is
equal to the sum across factors of the asset’s sensitivity to each factor times the factor’s price. With only one
factor, the no-arbitrage condition boils down to requiring that the factor’s price is equal to the ratio of any
asset’s expected excess return to the asset’s factor sensitivity. The no-arbitrage condition in our model is the
arbitrageurs’ first-order condition (14), and the price of the short-rate factor is λr,t.
Absence of arbitrage is mute on what the prices of the risk factors are. These prices are instead deter-
mined by equilibrium arguments. Equation (15) shows that λr,t is proportional to the factor sensitivity
− ∫∞
0
X
(τ)
t Ar(τ)dτ of the arbitrageurs’ portfolio. To determine that portfolio, we use market clearing.
Market clearing requires that the time-t positions of arbitrageurs and preferred-habitat investors in the
bond with maturity τ sum to zero:
(16) X
(τ)
t + Z
(τ)
t = 0.
Substituting X
(τ)
t from (16) into (15), we find
λr,t = aσ
2
r
∫ ∞
0
Z
(τ)
t Ar(τ)dτ
= aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
[
−α(τ) log(P (τ)t )− β(τ)t
]
Ar(τ)dτ
= aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
[α(τ) [Ar(τ)rt + C(τ)]− θ0(τ)]Ar(τ)dτ,(17)
where the second equality follows by substituting Z
(τ)
t from (5), and the third equality follows by substituting
P
(τ)
t from (10) and using β
(τ)
t = θ0(τ) (which follows by setting K = 0 in (6)). Equation (17) shows that the
price λr,t of the short-rate risk factor depends on the short rate rt and on the demand intercept θ0(τ) and
demand slope α(τ) of preferred-habitat investors. We return to these effects and their economic implications
in Sections 3.3-3.5.
Substituting λr,t and µ
(τ)
t from (17) and (12), respectively, into (14), we find
A′r(τ)rt + C
′(τ)−Ar(τ)κr(r − rt) + 1
2
Ar(τ)
2σ2r − rt
= aσ2rAr(τ)
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ) [Ar(τ)rt + C(τ)]]Ar(τ)dτ.(18)
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Equation (18) must hold for all values of rt. Hence, the linear terms in rt on both sides must be equal, and
the same is true for the terms that are independent of rt. This yields the two first-order linear ordinary
differential equations (ODEs)
A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− 1 = −aσ2rAr(τ)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)
2dτ,(19)
C ′(τ)− κrrAr(τ) + 1
2
σ2rAr(τ)
2 = aσ2rAr(τ)
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ)C(τ)]Ar(τ)dτ,(20)
in the functions (Ar(τ), C(τ)). Equations (19) and (20) must be solved with the initial conditions Ar(0) =
C(0) = 0, which follow from (10) because a bond with zero maturity trades at its face value of one. A
complicating feature of (19) and (20) is that the coefficient of Ar(τ) in each equation depends on an integral
involving the functions (Ar(τ), C(τ)). To solve (19) and (20), we proceed in two steps. First, we take the
integrals as given and solve (19) and (20) as linear ODEs with constant coefficients. Second, we require that
the solution is consistent with the value of the integrals.
The first step yields
Ar(τ) =
1− e−κ∗rτ
κ∗r
,(21)
C(τ) = κ∗rr
∗
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du− σ
2
r
2
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du,(22)
where the scalars (κ∗r , r
∗) are defined by
κ∗r ≡ κr + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)
2dτ,(23)
κ∗rr
∗ ≡ κrr + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ)C(τ)]Ar(τ)dτ.(24)
We use the star subscript because (κ∗r , r
∗) are the counterparts of (κr, r) under the risk-neutral measure. The
second step requires that (κ∗r , r
∗) solve (23) and (24) when (Ar(τ), C(τ)) are substituted in from (21) and
(22). Proposition 1 shows that this requirement determines (κ∗r , r
∗) uniquely.
Proposition 1 The functions (Ar(τ), C(τ)) are given by (21) and (22), respectively, where κ
∗
r is the unique
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solution to
(25) κ∗r = κr + aσ
2
r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−κ∗rτ
κ∗r
)2
dτ,
and r∗ is given by
(26) r∗ = r + aσ2r
∫∞
0
[θ0(τ)− rα(τ)τ ] 1−e−κ
∗
rτ
κ∗r
dτ +
σ2r
2
∫∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
(
1−e−κ∗ru
κ∗r
)2
du
]
1−e−κ∗rτ
κ∗r
dτ
κ∗r
[
1 + aσ2r
∫∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
1−e−κ∗ru
κ∗r
du
]
1−e−κ∗rτ
κ∗r
dτ
] .
We next explore the economic implications of the equilibrium derived in Proposition 1. Section 3.3 examines
how shocks to the short rate are transmitted to longer maturities. Section 3.4 examines how bond expected
excess returns depend on the short rate and on the shape of the term structure. Section 3.5 examines how
changes in bond demand affect the term structure.
3.3. Monetary Policy Transmission and Carry Trades
In the segmentation equilibrium, in which there are no arbitrageurs, bond yields y
(τ)
t are disconnected from
the short rate rt. By contrast, when arbitrageurs are present, they transmit short-rate shocks to bond yields,
ensuring that yields are informative about the current and expected future short rates.
Arbitrageurs transmit short-rate shocks to bond yields through their carry trades. Suppose that a shock
causes the short rate to drop below the value that bond yields would take in the segmentation equilibrium.
To benefit from the discrepancy between bond yields and the short rate, arbitrageurs buy bonds and finance
their position by borrowing short-term. Their activity causes bond prices to rise and yields to drop, thus
reflecting the drop in the short rate. Conversely, following a shock that causes the short rate to exceed the
value that bond yields would take under segmentation, arbitrageurs short-sell bonds and invest short-term.
Their activity causes bond prices to drop and yields to rise, thus reflecting the rise in the short rate. In both
cases, arbitrageurs engage in carry trades—trades that are profitable when prices do not move. For example,
buying a bond and financing that position by short-term borrowing is profitable when the short rate remains
below the bond’s yield until the bond’s maturity.
The extent to which arbitrageurs transmit short-rate shocks to bond yields depends on three main pa-
rameters of our model: the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coefficient a, the volatility σr of the short rate, and
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the slope α(τ) of the demand by preferred-habitat investors. When a = 0, arbitrageurs are not averse to
the risk that carry trades entail, namely, that the short rate can rise when they borrow short-term to buy
bonds, and that the short rate can drop when they short-sell bonds and invest short-term. Hence, arbitrageurs
engage in carry trades that are sufficiently large to transmit short-rate shocks fully to bond yields. When
α(τ) = 0 for all τ ∈ (0, T ), shocks are again transmitted fully, but for a different reason. Since the demand
of preferred-habitat investors is independent of bond prices, short-rate shocks do not trigger carry trades by
arbitrageurs in equilibrium, even though bond yields change. Hence, arbitrageurs impact bond yields without
bearing carry-trade risk, in effect having infinite price impact. The transmission of shocks becomes weaker
when a, σ2r and α(τ) increase.
We measure the extent to which arbitrageurs transmit short-rate shocks to bond yields by comparing the
reaction of forward rates to that of expected future short rates. We evaluate how a time-t shock to the short
rate rt affects the expected short rate Et(rt+τ ) at time t + τ and the instantaneous forward rate f
(τ)
t for
maturity τ . The latter rate is defined as the limit of the forward rate f
(τ−∆τ,τ)
t between maturities τ −∆τ
and τ when ∆τ goes to zero:
(27) f
(τ)
t ≡ lim
∆τ→0
f
(τ−∆τ,τ)
t = −
∂ log(P
(τ)
t )
∂τ
= A′r(τ)rt + C
′(τ),
where the second step follows from (2), and the third from (10). When the expectations hypothesis (EH)
of the term structure holds, forward rates move one-to-one with expected future short rates. Proposition 2
shows that when a > 0 and α(τ) > 0, forward rates under-react and hence arbitrageurs transmit short-rate
shocks to bond yields only partially.
Formally, a unit shock to rt raises Et(rt+τ ) by e
−κrτ because the short rate mean-reverts at rate κr.
Equation (27) implies that f
(τ)
t rises by A
′
r(τ) = e
−κ∗rτ , where the equality follows from (21). Under-reaction
occurs because the short rate’s mean-reversion parameter κ∗r under the risk-neutral measure exceeds its
counterpart κr under the physical measure. Equation (25) implies that the difference κ
∗
r − κr, and hence the
extent of under-reaction, increases in a, σ2r and α(τ).
Proposition 2 (Under-Reaction of Forward Rates) A unit shock to the short rate rt:
• Raises the expected short rate Et(rt+τ ) at time t+ τ by ∂Et(rt+τ )∂rt = e−κrτ .
A PREFERRED-HABITAT MODEL OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 19
• Raises the instantaneous forward rate f (τ)t for maturity τ by ∂f
(τ)
t
∂rt
= e−κ
∗
rτ .
The forward rate under-reacts (κ∗r > κr) if arbitrageurs are risk-averse (a > 0) and the demand by preferred-
habitat investors is price-elastic (α(τ) > 0 in a positive-measure subset of (0,∞)). The extent of under-
reaction κ∗r − κr increases in a, σ2r and α(τ).
Our results have implications for the transmission of monetary policy. Suppose that the central bank
conducts monetary policy by changing the rate that it pays on bank reserves. Suppose also that arbitrageurs
are banks, in which case the short rate rt that they earn on their wealth is the rate paid on reserves. Our
model implies that the transmission of monetary-policy shocks to the yields of long-maturity bonds is done
by arbitrageurs. Moreover, the transmission mechanism is weaker when arbitrageurs are more risk-averse,
central bank actions are more uncertain (the short rate is more volatile), or the demand by preferred-habitat
investors is more price-elastic. An additional implication is that in transmitting monetary-policy shocks,
arbitrageurs earn a rent. That rent arises from the returns on the carry trades, and reflects bond risk premia,
as we explain in Section 3.4. In that section we also show that bond risk premia are larger, resulting in a
larger rent for arbitrageurs, under the same conditions that generate a weaker transmission mechanism.
3.4. Bond Risk Premia
Under the EH, bond expected returns are equal to the riskless rate. When instead a > 0 and α(τ) > 0,
they differ from the riskless rate and mirror the carry trades of arbitrageurs. This is because risk-averse
arbitrageurs enter into the carry trades only if they expect to earn high returns as compensation for the
risk they take. Suppose that the short rate drops, in which case bond yields drop and price-elastic preferred-
habitat investors sell bonds. Bonds earn then positive expected returns in excess of the riskless rate so that
arbitrageurs are induced to buy them. When instead the short rate rises, bonds earn negative expected excess
returns so that arbitrageurs are induced to sell them short. We refer to expected excess returns as risk premia
because they compensate arbitrageurs for risk.
Since in the absence of demand risk factors, the short rate is the only source of time-variation, bond
risk premia are positively related to the slope of the term structure: a low (high) short rate implies both a
term structure with slope higher (lower) than average and positive (negative) bond risk premia. The positive
premia-slope relationship is a widely documented empirical fact in the term-structure literature, starting with
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Fama and Bliss (FB, 1987). FB perform the regression
(28)
1
∆τ
log
(
P
(τ−∆τ)
t+∆τ
P
(τ)
t
)
− y(∆τ)t = aFB + bFB
(
f
(τ−∆τ,τ)
t − y(∆τ)t
)
+ et+∆τ .
The dependent variable is the return on a zero-coupon bond with maturity τ held over a period ∆τ , in excess
of the spot rate for maturity ∆τ . The independent variable is the slope of the term structure as measured
by the difference between the forward rate between maturities τ −∆τ and τ , and the spot rate for maturity
∆τ . FB find that bFB is positive, larger than one for most τ , and increasing in τ . The implied time-variation
of risk premia is economically significant: predicted premia have a standard deviation of about 1-1.5% per
year, while average premia are about 0.5% per year.
The behavior of bond risk premia is related to the predictability of changes to long rates. Campbell and
Shiller (CS 1991) find that the slope of the term structure predicts changes in long rates, but to a weaker
and typically opposite extent than implied by the EH. CS perform the regression
(29) y
(τ−∆τ)
t+∆τ − y(τ)t = aCS + bCS
∆τ
τ −∆τ
(
y
(τ)
t − y(∆τ)t
)
+ et+∆τ .
The dependent variable is the change, between times t and t + ∆τ , in the yield of a zero-coupon bond that
has maturity τ at time t. The independent variable is the difference between the spot rates for maturities
τ and ∆τ , normalized so that the regression coefficient bCS is equal to one under the EH. CS find that bCS
is smaller than one, negative for most τ , and decreasing in τ . This finding is related to the positive premia-
slope relationship. Indeed, suppose that the term structure has slope higher than average. Because bonds
earn positive expected excess returns, their yields increase by less than under the EH, implying a regression
coefficient bCS smaller than one.
14
Proposition 3 computes the FB and CS regression coefficients bFB and bCS in the analytically convenient
case where ∆τ is small. The proposition confirms that when a > 0 and α(τ) > 0, bFB is positive and bCS is
smaller than one. It also shows that bFB increases in the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coefficient a, the volatility
σr of the short rate, and the slope α(τ) of the demand by preferred-habitat investors.
Additional implications of Proposition 3 are that bFB is independent of τ and is smaller than one, and that
bCS increases in τ . In the data, by contrast, bFB increases in τ and exceeds one for most maturities, and bCS
14For more material and references on bond return predictability, see the survey by Cochrane (1999). See also Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005) who find that a tent-shaped factor of yields explains bond risk premia even better than the slope of the term
structure does.
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decreases in τ . Our model can match these empirical properties in the presence of demand risk, as we show
in Sections 4 and 5.
Proposition 3 (Positive Premia-Slope Relationship) For ∆τ → 0 and for all τ :
• The FB regression coefficient in (28) is bFB = κ
∗
r−κr
κ∗r
. It is positive if arbitrageurs are risk-averse (a > 0)
and the demand by preferred-habitat investors is price-elastic (α(τ) > 0 in a positive-measure subset of
(0,∞)). It increases in a, σ2r and α(τ).
• The CS regression coefficient in (29) is bCS = 1− (κ
∗
r−κr)Ar(τ)τ
τ−Ar(τ) . It is smaller than one under the same
condition that ensures bFB > 0, and it increases in τ .
3.5. Demand Effects
In the segmentation equilibrium, in which there are no arbitrageurs, the yield y
(τ)
t for maturity τ depends
only on the demand intercept β
(τ)
t = θ0(τ) and demand slope α(τ) for that maturity. The presence of
arbitrageurs changes that aspect of the equilibrium dramatically. The yield y
(τ)
t depends on the demand
intercept and slope for all maturities. Moreover, a change in the demand intercept and slope for maturity τ
can have its largest effects for maturities other than τ .
Suppose that the demand intercept θ0(τ) changes to θ0(τ) + ∆θ0(τ), where ∆θ0(τ) is a general function of
τ and represents an unanticipated and permanent change. Maturities for which ∆θ0(τ) > 0 experience a drop
in demand because (5) defines the demand intercept with a negative sign. Proposition 1 implies that κ∗r and
Ar(τ) do not change, that the change ∆r
∗ in r∗ has the same sign as aσ2r
∫∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ , and that C(τ)
changes by κ∗r∆r
∗ ∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du. Hence, the yield y
(τ)
t for maturity τ changes by ∆y
(τ)
t ≡ κ∗r∆r∗
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
τ .
Proposition 4 follows from these observations.
Proposition 4 (Global Demand Effects) A change in the demand intercept from θ0(τ) to θ0(τ)+∆θ0(τ)
affects yields if arbitrageurs are risk-averse (a > 0). Spot rates for all maturities rise if
∫∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ > 0
and drop otherwise. The relative effect across maturities is independent of the maturities where the demand
change originates (
∆y
(τ2)
t
∆y
(τ1)
t
is independent of ∆θ0(τ)). Yields for longer maturities are more affected (
∆y
(τ2)
t
∆y
(τ1)
t
> 1
for τ1 < τ2).
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Proposition 4 shows that the effects of the change ∆θ0(τ) are characterized fully by the integral
∫∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ .
If that integral is positive, then yields for all maturities rise—even for maturities for which demand increases
because ∆θ0(τ) < 0. Thus, demand effects are global: demand intercepts across all maturities are aggre-
gated into the one-dimensional index
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ , and changes to that index move all yields in the
same direction. These global effects are the polar opposite of the local effects derived in the segmentation
equilibrium.
Demand effects are represented by a one-dimensional index because there is only one risk factor, the short
rate. The index relates to the sensitivity of arbitrageurs’ portfolio to that factor. Suppose that following a
change in preferred-habitat demand, arbitrageurs are induced to hold a portfolio that realizes more losses
when the short rate increases. Arbitrageurs then view bonds as riskier and require higher expected excess
returns to hold them, causing yields to increase for all maturities.
The index is derived by multiplying the demand intercept θ0(τ) for maturity τ by the function Ar(τ) =
1−e−κ∗rτ
κ∗r
that characterizes the sensitivity of the τ -maturity bond to the short rate, and integrating across
maturities. If a change in the demand intercept raises that integral, then the sensitivity-weighted demand
for bonds by preferred-habitat investors declines and the sensitivity of arbitrageurs’ portfolio increases. Since
Ar(τ) increases in τ , demand intercepts for longer-maturity bonds receive a larger weight in the index. Hence,
changes to the demand for these bonds have a larger effect on the term structure.
While changes to the demand for longer-maturity bonds have a larger effect on yields, the relative effect
across maturities is the same as when the demand for shorter-maturity bonds changes. Moreover, yields for
longer maturities are more affected (by any demand change). Intuitively, a decrease in demand raises the
instantaneous expected returns of long-maturity bonds more than of short-maturity bonds. This is because
expected excess returns compensate arbitrageurs for risk, and long-maturity bonds are riskier (Ar(τ) increases
in τ). The increase in expected returns causes yields to increase: the yield for maturity τ involves an average
of instantaneous expected returns that the bond with maturity τ earns during its life [t, t+ τ ]. Since demand
changes are permanent, the average of instantaneous expected returns increases more for longer-maturity
bonds. Hence, yields for longer maturities are more affected by demand changes.
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4. DEMAND RISK
In this section we generalize our analysis to the case where demand is time-varying. Since demand affects
yields only when arbitrageurs are risk-averse, we assume a > 0. Time-variation in yields arises because of the
short rate rt and the K demand factors {βk,t}k=1,..,K .
4.1. Equilibrium
We derive the equilibrium following the same three steps as in Section 3.2. We conjecture that there exist
K+2 functions (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..,K , C(τ)) that depend only on τ such that the time-t price of the bond
with maturity τ is
(30) P
(τ)
t = e
−[A(τ)>qt+C(τ)],
where A(τ) is the (K + 1)× 1 vector (Ar(τ), Aβ,1(τ), .., Aβ,K(τ))>. Applying Ito’s Lemma to (10), using the
dynamics (7) of qt, and noting that t+ τ stays constant when taking the derivative, we find that the time-t
instantaneous return on the bond with maturity τ is
(31)
dP
(τ)
t
P
(τ)
t
= µ
(τ)
t dt−A(τ)>ΣdBt,
where
(32) µ
(τ)
t ≡ A′(τ)>qt + C ′(τ) +A(τ)>Γ(qt − rE) +
1
2
A(τ)>ΣΣ>A(τ)
is the instantaneous expected return. Substituting the bond return (31) into the the arbitrageurs’ optimization
problem (4) yields
(33) max
{X(τ)t }τ∈(0,T )
{∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t (µ
(τ)
t − rt)dτ −
a
2
[∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t A(τ)dτ
]>
ΣΣ>
[∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t A(τ)dτ
]}
.
Point-wise maximization of (33) yields the arbitrageurs’ first-order condition.
Lemma 2 The arbitrageurs’ first-order condition is
(34) µ
(τ)
t − rt = aA(τ)>ΣΣ>
[∫ ∞
0
X
(τ)
t A(τ)dτ
]
.
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Equation (34) is the multi-factor counterpart of (14). The left-hand side is the increase in portfolio expected
return if arbitrageurs shift one unit of the numeraire from the short rate rt to the bond with maturity τ .
The right-hand side is the increase in portfolio risk, times the arbitrageurs’ risk aversion coefficient a. The
increase in portfolio risk is equal to the covariance between the return on the additional investment in the
bond and the return on the arbitrageurs’ portfolio. With multiple risk factors, the covariance is the product
of the sensitivity vectors A(τ) and
∫∞
0
X
(τ)
t A(τ)dτ of the two returns to the factors, times the factors’
covariance matrix ΣΣ>. To show the full analogy between (34) and (14), we can write (34) in terms of factor
prices. Denoting the (K + 1)× 1 vector of factor prices by λt ≡ (λr,t, λβ,1,t, .., λβ,K,t)>, we can write (34) as
µ
(τ)
t − rt = aA(τ)>λt and deduce that factor prices are λt = ΣΣ>
[∫∞
0
X
(τ)
t A(τ)dτ
]
.
Substituting X
(τ)
t from the market-clearing equation (16) into (34), using (5), (6), (30) and (32), and
denoting by Θ(τ) the 1× (K + 1) vector (0, θ1(τ), .., θK(τ)), we find the following counterpart of (18):
A′(τ)>qt + C ′(τ) +A(τ)>Γ(qt − rE) + 1
2
A(τ)>ΣΣ>A(τ)− rt
= aA(τ)>ΣΣ>
∫ ∞
0
[
θ0(τ) + Θ(τ)qt − α(τ)
(
A(τ)>qt + C(τ)
)]
A(τ)dτ.(35)
Setting the linear terms in qt on both sides of (35) to be equal yields the system of K + 1 first-order linear
ODEs
(36) A′(τ) +MA(τ)− E = 0,
where M is the (K + 1)× (K + 1) matrix
(37) M ≡ Γ> − a
∫ ∞
0
[
Θ(τ)>A(τ)> − α(τ)A(τ)A(τ)>]ΣΣ>.
Setting the terms that are independent of qt on both sides of (35) to be equal yields the first-order linear
ODE
(38) C ′(τ)− rA(τ)>ΓE+ 1
2
A(τ)>ΣΣ>A(τ) = aA(τ)>ΣΣ>
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ)C(τ)]A(τ)dτ.
Equations (36) and (38) must be solved with the initial conditions A(0) = C(0) = 0. To solve (36) and (38),
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we follow the same two steps as in Section 3. The first step is to take the integrals in (36) and (38) as given
and solve these equations as linear ODEs with constant coefficients. The solution is in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the matrix M defined in (37) has K + 1 distinct eigenvalues (ν1, .., νK+1). The
function A(τ) = (Ar(τ), Aβ,1(τ), .., Aβ,K(τ))
> is given by
Ar(τ) =
1− e−ν1τ
ν1
+
K∑
k′=1
φr,k′
(
1− e−νk′+1τ
νk′+1
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
,(39)
Aβ,k(τ) =
K∑
k′=1
φβ,k,k′
(
1− e−νk′+1τ
νk′+1
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
,(40)
where ({φr,k′}k′=1,..,K , {φβ,k,k′}k,k′=1,..,K) are scalars derived from the eigenvectors of M . The function C(τ)
is given by
(41) C(τ) =
[∫ τ
0
A(u)>du
]
χ− 1
2
∫ τ
0
A(u)>ΣΣ>A(u)du,
where χ ≡ (χr, χβ,1, .., χβ,K)> is the (K + 1)× 1 vector
(42) χ ≡ rΓE+ aΣΣ>
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ)C(τ)]A(τ)dτ.
The second step is to ensure that the solution derived in Lemma 3 is consistent with the value of the inte-
grals. There are (K+1)2 integrals in (36). These integrals involve theK+1 functions (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..K),
and determine the elements of the (K + 1)× (K + 1) matrix M defined in (37). In turn, the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of M determine the solution for (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..K) in Lemma 3, and that solution de-
termines the value of the integrals. This yields a nonlinear system of (K + 1)2 equations in the (K + 1)2
integrals. Given a solution to that system, the elements (χr, χβ,1, .., χβ,K) of the vector χ in the solution for
C(τ) in Lemma 3 can be derived from a linear system of K + 1 equations.
In the remainder of this section, we show analytically general properties of the model. We focus on the case
where there is one demand factor (K = 1, four nonlinear equations) and omit the subscript k from that factor.
We additionally assume that the short rate and the demand factor are independent. This corresponds to the
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matrices (Γ,Σ) being diagonal. We denote their diagonal elements by (κr, κβ , σr, σβ) ≡ (Γ1,1,Γ2,2,Σ1,1,Σ2,2).
The case with one independent demand factor is a natural first case to analyze, and it yields a rich set of
results. We analyze the same case numerically in Section 5, where we perform a calibration exercise.15 We
discuss the general case briefly at the end of Section 4.4.
Two useful assumptions for deriving some of our analytical results are that the functions (α(τ), {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K)
are exponentials or linear combinations of exponentials. Under these assumptions, the integrals in (36) in-
volve Laplace transforms of the functions (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..K) and of those functions’ pairwise products.
Moreover, by multiplying the ODE system (36) by the exponentials in (α(τ), {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K) and by the prod-
ucts of these exponentials with the functions (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..K), we find equations that involve the
same Laplace transforms. This yields a system of equations in the Laplace transforms, derived in Appendix
A for the general case (Lemma A.1). While that system remains nonlinear, a key advantage of the Laplace-
transform approach is that we do not need to compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of M , which can be
real or complex.
We begin our analytical investigation by showing existence of equilibrium. We take the demand elasticity
α(τ) to be the declining exponential α(τ) = αe−δατ , where (α, δα) are positive constants. We take the
impact θ(τ) of the single demand factor on the demand intercept to be a difference between two exponentials
θ(τ) = θ
(
e−δατ − e−δθτ), where (θ, δθ) are positive constants and δα < δθ. A unit increase in the demand
factor βt raises the spot rate for maturity τ in the segmentation equilibrium by
θ(τ)
α(τ)τ
=
θ
(
1− −(δθ−δα)τ)
ατ
.
This function has a positive limit at τ = 0 and decreases in τ .
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Existence) Suppose that there is one demand factor, the matrices (Γ,Σ) are
diagonal, α(τ) = αe−δατ and θ(τ) = θ
(
e−δατ − e−δθτ), where (α, θ, δα, δθ) are positive constants and δθ is
large. An equilibrium exists under either of the following sufficient conditions:
• κβ is close to zero.
• δα(δα + κr)(δα + κβ) > 2aθσrσβ.
15Hayashi (2018) derives two alternative numerical algorithms for solving our model in the case α(τ) = 0. Both algorithms
discretize the functions (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..K), without imposing the structure derived in Lemma 3. They have the advantage
of handling large values of K as easily as small values.
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In equilibrium, M1,1 > κr, M1,2 > 0, M2,1 < 0 and M2,2 >
κβ−δα
2 .
We complement the existence result in Theorem 1 by computing in Appendix A (Lemma A.2) the equilib-
rium in closed form when the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coefficient a is close to zero or to infinity and other
parameters can take any values. For our analysis of a ≈ 0 and a ≈ ∞, we require that α(τ) and θ(τ)τ have a
positive and a finite limit, respectively, at τ = 0. That restriction is satisfied by the specification in Theorem
1.16 We next examine how the results of Sections 3.3-3.5 are modified in the presence of demand risk.
4.2. Carry Trades and Hedging
Demand risk weakens the transmission of short-rate shocks to bond yields. This is because the carry trades
through which arbitrageurs transmit the shocks become riskier. To hedge against demand risk, arbitrageurs
scale down their carry trades or even convert them into butterfly trades, reversing the sign of their positions
for long maturities. Because of hedging, short-rate shocks can move yields for long maturities in the direction
opposite to the shocks.
To explain hedging in our model, suppose as in Section 3.3 that a shock causes the short rate to drop below
the value that bond yields would take in the segmentation equilibrium. Arbitrageurs can benefit from the
discrepancy between bond yields and the short rate by buying bonds and borrowing short-term. This carry
trade leaves them exposed to a rise in the short rate, as in Section 3.3, and to a drop in bond demand by
preferred-habitat investors. The importance of demand risk relative to short-rate risk rises with maturity. This
is shown in Proposition 5, and can be partly anticipated from the one-factor model, in which short-rate shocks
have an effect on yields that declines with maturity, while permanent demand changes have an increasing
effect. Because long-maturity bonds are highly exposed to demand risk, arbitrageurs can short-sell them to
hedge the demand risk of their aggregate position. Such short-selling occurs when arbitrageurs are sufficiently
risk-averse, and causes yields for long maturities to rise despite the drop in current and expected future short
rates. Buying intermediate-maturity bonds and short-selling long-maturity ones and very short-maturity ones
(i.e., borrowing short-term) is a butterfly trade, common in term-structure arbitrage.17
16For a ≈ 0, our model becomes approximately a one-factor one, with the factor being the short rate. This is because shocks
to the demand factors have small effects on bond yields. The effects of demand shocks are characterized by the one-dimensional
index derived in Proposition 4, with κ∗r = κr. The only difference relative to Proposition 4 is that yields for longer maturities
may not be the most affected. This is because Proposition 4 assumes permanent demand changes, while shocks to the demand
factors mean-revert.
17An example of a butterfly trade comes from the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Short-rate cuts triggered by the crisis rendered
the US term structure steeply upward sloping. Term structure arbitrageurs took the view that forward rates did not drop enough
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Proposition 5 characterizes the response of yields to short-rate and demand shocks. The proposition assumes
M2,1 < 0, a property shown to hold for the equilibrium derived in Theorem 1. The assumptions of Theorem
1 are not needed as long as that property holds.
The characterization is simple when the two eigenvalues of M are real. The function Aβ(τ) is positive,
which implies that a drop in demand causes yields for all maturities to rise, and increases in τ . The function
Ar(τ) is either positive, or switches sign from positive to negative when τ crosses a threshold τ¯ . In the latter
case, a drop in the short rate causes yields for maturities τ > τ¯ to rise. The ratio Ar(τ)Aβ(τ) decreases in τ , which
implies that the effect of demand shocks relative to short-rate shocks rises with maturity.
When the two eigenvalues of M are complex, the functions (Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) exhibit an oscillating pattern
driven by the arbitrageurs’ hedging activity. Following a rise in the short rate, prices of short-maturity bonds
drop. Prices of long-maturity bonds can instead rise because arbitrageurs can buy them to hedge demand risk.
Long-maturity bonds can thus hedge the short-rate risk of a portfolio with long positions in bonds, and earn
negative expected excess returns when arbitrageurs hold such a portfolio in equilibrium. Since arbitrageurs
hold long positions when demand by preferred-habitat investors is low, low demand can cause, through the
cumulation of negative expected returns, the prices of bonds of even longer (“very long”) maturities to rise.
In that case, arbitrageurs do not use the very-long-maturity bonds to hedge demand risk, and those bonds’
prices rise following a drop in the short rate. This yields an oscillating pattern of price sensitivity to the short
rate as a function of maturity. The properties shown for real eigenvalues carry through to complex ones for
the first half-cycle of the oscillation (which can be longer than the maximum maturity T ). The functions
(Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) begin by being increasing in τ . The function Ar(τ) eventually reaches a maximum, and the
function Aβ(τ) does so at a larger value τˆ which marks the end of the first half-cycle. We set τˆ = ∞ when
the two eigenvalues of M are real.
Proposition 5 (Effect of Short-Rate and Demand Shocks) Suppose that there is one demand factor,
to reflect the low expected future spot rates—the under-reaction result of Proposition 2. For example, a Barclays Capital report
by Pradhan (2009), p.2., points out that while the two-year spot rate was 258 bps lower than the ten-year spot rate, the difference
between their two-year forward counterparts was only 93bps. The report goes on to advise lending at the two-year rate two years
forward and borrowing at the ten-year rate two years forward. Lending at the two-year rate two years forward is a carry trade:
it amounts to shorting two-year bonds and buying four-year bonds. Borrowing at the ten-year rate two years forward amounts
to buying two-year bonds and shorting twelve-year bonds. That position is layered to the carry trade to hedge term-structure
movements at intermediate maturities, and is for a smaller notional amount since the twelve-year bond is more sensitive to
such movements than the four-year bond. The overall trade is a butterfly: a short position in two-year bonds, a long position in
four-year bonds, and a short position in twelve-year bonds. It exerts upward pressure on the twelve-year spot rate, even though
it is triggered by a drop in the short rate.
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the matrices (Γ,Σ) are diagonal, and M2,1 < 0.
• If the two eigenvalues of M are real, then Aβ(τ) > 0, A′β(τ) > 0 and
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
< 0. Moreover, Ar(τ) > 0
for τ ∈ (0, τ¯) and Ar(τ) < 0 for τ ∈ (τ¯ ,∞), where τ¯ = ∞ when a ≈ 0 or α(τ) = 0, and τ¯ < ∞ when
a ≈ ∞.
• If the two eigenvalues of M are complex, then Aβ(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, τ¯), and A′β(τ) > 0 and
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
< 0
for τ ∈ (0, τˆ), where τ¯ > τˆ > 0. If τ¯ < ∞, then Ar(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, τ¯), where τ¯ ∈ (0, τ¯). When the
thresholds (τ¯ , τ¯, τˆ) are crossed, the respective inequalities switch.
4.3. Bond Risk Premia
Demand risk strengthens the positive premia-slope relationship derived in Section 3.4. Indeed, low demand
by preferred-habitat investors implies positive bond risk premia because arbitrageurs must be induced to buy
the bonds to make up for the low investor demand. Because of the positive premia, yields are high and the
term structure is upward-sloping.
Proposition 6 computes the FB and CS coefficients bFB and bCS. It shows that bFB is positive and bCS is
smaller than one for at least all maturities such that the functions (Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) are positive and Aβ(τ)
increases in τ , and for all maturities when a is close to zero or to infinity. Moreover, when a ≈ ∞ and the
average maturity where demand shocks originate is sufficiently long, bFB exceeds one and increases in τ , while
bCS is negative and decreases in τ .
Proposition 6 (Demand Risk Strengthens Positive Premia-Slope Relationship) Suppose that
there is one demand factor, the matrices (Γ,Σ) are diagonal, M1,2 ≥ 0, M2,1 < 0 and ∆τ → 0.
• The FB regression coefficient in (28) is positive for τ < min{τ¯ , τˆ}, and for all τ when a ≈ 0 or a ≈ ∞.
When a ≈ ∞ and
(43)
∫∞
0
θ(τ)τdτ∫∞
0
θ(τ)dτ
>
∫∞
0
α(τ)τ2dτ∫∞
0
α(τ)τdτ
,
bFB exceeds one and increases in τ .
• The CS regression coefficient in (29) is smaller than one for τ < min{τ¯ , τˆ}, and for all τ when a ≈ 0
or a ≈ ∞. When a ≈ 0, bCS is close to one and increases in τ . When a ≈ ∞ and (43) holds, bCS is
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negative and decreases in τ .
4.4. Demand Effects
Suppose, as in Section 3.5, that the demand intercept θ0(τ) changes to θ0(τ) + ∆θ0(τ), where ∆θ0(τ) is
a general function of τ . The functions (Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) do not change, and the effects on yields are entirely
through C(τ). Because there are two risk factors, the effects are represented by two one-dimensional indices.
The indices are
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ and
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ , and relate to the sensitivity of arbitrageurs’ portfolio
to the short-rate and the demand factor, respectively.
While demand effects retain a global flavor because they are represented by only two indices across a
continuum of maturities, they become more localized relative to the one-factor case. Recall from Section 3.5
that with only one factor, demand changes have the same relative effect across maturities regardless of the
maturities where they originate. This independence result does not extend to two factors. The maturities
where demand shocks originate matter because they influence how the shocks affect one index relative to the
other, and because changes to each index have a different relative effect across maturities. Changes to the
demand for long-maturity bonds have a large effect on
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ relative to
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ , and
changes to
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ have a large effect on long rates relative to short rates. Hence, the effects of long-
maturity bond demand are more pronounced at the long end of the term structure. In comparison, changes
to the demand for short-maturity bonds have a larger relative effect on
∫∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ , and changes to
that index have a larger relative effect on short rates. Hence, the effects of short-maturity bond demand are
more pronounced at the short end.
The economic intuition is as follows. Suppose that the demand by preferred-habitat investors for long-
maturity bonds declines, in which case arbitrageurs take up the slack by purchasing those bonds. Since
bonds’ sensitivity to demand shocks relative to short-rate shocks rises with maturity, arbitrageurs’ exposure
to demand risk increases significantly, while their exposure to short-rate risk increases more mildly. The
expected excess returns that arbitrageurs require to bear demand risk increase significantly as well. Since
bonds’ sensitivity to demand shocks rises faster with maturity than their sensitivity to short-rate shocks,
long-maturity bonds experience a sharp increase in their expected excess returns relative to short-maturity
bonds. Hence, long rates increase sharply. By contrast, when the demand by preferred-habitat investors for
short-maturity bonds declines, long rates increase less than short rates.
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To show a formal result on localization, we consider the simple case where the change ∆θ0(τ) represents
a decrease in demand for a specific short maturity τ1 or a specific long maturity τ2 > τ1. We denote the
resulting changes in the yield y
(τ)
t by ∆y
(τ)
t,τ1 and ∆y
(τ)
t,τ2 , respectively.
Proposition 7 (Localization of Demand Effects) When there is one demand factor, a change in the de-
mand intercept from θ0(τ) to θ0(τ)+∆θ0(τ) affects yields only through
∫∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ and
∫∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ .
When additionally the matrices (Γ,Σ) are diagonal, M2,1 < 0, α(τ) is non-increasing, and the change ∆θ0(τ)
is a Dirac function with point mass at τ1 < τˆ or at τ2 ∈ (τ1, τˆ),
(44) ∆y
(τ1)
t,τ1 ∆y
(τ2)
t,τ2 > ∆y
(τ2)
t,τ1 ∆y
(τ1)
t,τ2 .
Equation (44) states that the product of the “local” effects that the changes have on the maturity where
they originate exceeds the product of the “cross” effects on the other maturity. Local effects are thus stronger
than cross effects.
We expect full localization when there is a large number of demand factors and arbitrageurs are highly
risk-averse. Indeed, suppose that a demand shock originating at maturity τ1 has its largest effect at maturity
τ2 6= τ1. For this to happen, arbitrageurs must hold non-zero positions in at least the bonds of one of the two
maturities. Highly risk-averse arbitrageurs, however, hold non-zero positions only if their exposure to all risk
factors is zero, which is infeasible with a large number of factors. Proposition 1 implies a full localization result
for the effects of short-rate shocks: since the function Ar(τ) converges to zero when the arbitrageurs’ risk-
aversion coefficient a goes to infinity, the effects of short-rate shocks become localized at the zero maturity.
We can derive the same localization result with one and two demand factors, using closed-form solutions for
the large a limit. Extending the full localization result for the effects of demand shocks requires extending
our solutions to a large number of demand factors and is left for future work.
5. CALIBRATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS
In this section we calibrate our model and analyze the effects of different policies by central banks. Since
the model can be given both a nominal and a real interpretation, we calibrate it using nominal yields and then
again using real yields. In all calibrations we assume that there is one demand factor which is independent
of the short rate. We leave the correlated case, which seems more relevant for the nominal calibration, for
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future work. The independent case is a natural first case to investigate, and it yields a remarkably similar
analysis of central-bank policies across the nominal and real calibrations.
5.1. Calibration
The equilibrium term structure is determined by the parameters (r, κr, σr) of the short-rate process, the
parameters (κβ , σβ) of the demand-factor process, the risk-aversion coefficient a of arbitrageurs, and the
functions (α(τ), θ0(τ), θ(τ)) that describe the demand slope and intercept of preferred-habitat investors.
The values of (r, θ0(τ)) affect only the long-run averages of yields and of agents’ positions. They do not
matter for our policy analysis, which concerns how yields and positions respond to shocks. We sketch a
calibration of these parameters in Section 5.3, where we compute unconditional moments of bond returns.
We set α(τ) = αe−δατ and θ(τ) = θ(e−δατ − e−δθτ ) for τ < T , and α(τ) = θ(τ) = 0 for τ > T . This is the
same exponential specification as in Theorem 1, except that we take the maximum bond maturity T to be
finite. We set T = 30 years, the maximum maturity for U.S. government bonds.
The values of (θ(τ), σβ) matter only through their product because (θ(τ), βt) affect the demand of preferred-
habitat investors only through their product as well. We can hence normalize σβ to an arbitrary value, and
we set it equal to σr.
We calibrate the remaining eight parameters (κr, σr, κβ , a, α, θ, δα, δθ) using U.S. data on bond yields and
trading volume, as well as estimates of demand elasticity from the literature. For bond yields, we use the
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (GKS) datasets, which report daily spot rates extracted from government bond
prices. The dataset on nominal yields goes from June 1961 to the present. We start our main sample of
nominal yields in November 1985, because this is the earliest when all maturities from one to 30 years are
included, and end it in January 2020. The dataset on real yields goes from January 1999 to the present, and
includes all maturities from two to 20 years. We start our sample of real yields in January 1999 and end it
in January 2020. In addition to our main sample of nominal yields, we consider a sub-sample covering the
same period as the sample of real yields. We source nominal and real yields at the end of each month. For
bond trading volume, we use the FR 2004 dataset, which reports daily volume by primary dealers in the
Treasury market, split into buckets based on the bonds’ remaining time to maturity. Volume on real bonds
(TIPS) is approximately 3% of total volume, and is not split into maturity buckets until March 2020. For
that reason, we use the volume split for nominal bonds in all calibrations. We do not include T-bills in our
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volume calculations because of their special features (e.g., extensive use as collateral). T-bills are also not
included in the GKS datasets. The dataset on volume goes from April 2013 to the present. We end it in
January 2020, and use averages within that period in all calibrations. For demand elasticity, we use estimates
from Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (KVJ 2012).18
Table I reports the calibrated parameters and the empirical moments used to determine them, for the
main sample of nominal yields. Tables C.I and C.II in Appendix C report the same information for the sub-
sample of nominal yields and the sample of real yields, respectively. We express yields and their volatilities
in percentage terms throughout this section, e.g., a yield of 0.02 is expressed as 2.
We determine the first seven parameters in Table I by equating the first seven empirical moments to their
model-generated counterparts. This requires solving a seven-equation non-linear system. The formulas for the
seven model-generated moments are in Appendix C. The seven moments concern volatilities and correlations
of yields and yield changes, and fractions of volume at different maturity buckets. Data on yields and relative
volume cannot identify the arbitrageurs’ risk-aversion coefficient a separately from the parameters (α, θ) that
characterize the slope of preferred-habitat demand and the magnitude of demand shocks, respectively. Only
the products (aα, aθ) can be identified. Intuitively, yields can be volatile because arbitrageurs are highly
risk-averse (high a) and demand shocks are small (low θ), or because arbitrageurs are less risk-averse and
demand shocks are larger.19 We determine α, the eighth parameter in Table I, based on KVJ’s estimates,
and deduce (a, θ) from the products (aα, aθ).
The empirical moment next to each parameter in Table I is the one identifying that parameter. We address
identification formally in Appendix C, where we compute a seven-by-seven table of elasticities of the first
seven moments with respect to the first seven parameters. The elasticity table validates the mapping in
Table I except for the fourth and fifth moments, for which cross-effects from the fifth and fourth parameter,
respectively, are important.
The mean-reversion κr and diffusion σr of the short rate rt have their largest effect on the one-year yield
y
(1)
t . An increase in σr raises the volatility of that yield and the volatility of yield changes. A decrease in κr
18The dataset of nominal yields is available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html
and is described in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007). The dataset of real yields is available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200805/200805abs.html. The FR 2004 dataset (which reports addi-
tional information to volume) is available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/gsds/search.
19Formally, (37) shows that the matrix M that determines (Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) through the ODE (36) depends on (a, α, θ) only
through the products (aα, aθ). Hence, (Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) have that property as well, and so do the moments of returns and volume
computed in Appendix C.
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TABLE I
Calibration of model parameters for the main sample of nominal yields.
Parameter Value Empirical moment Value
κr
Mean-reversion of rt
0.125
√
Var
(
y
(1)
t
)
Volatility 1-year yield
– Levels
2.62
σr
Diffusion of rt
0.0146
√
Var
(
y
(1)
t+1 − y(1)t
)
Volatility 1-year yield
– Annual changes
1.27
κβ
Mean-reversion of βt
0.053
1
30
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
Volatility τ -year yield
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raises the yield’s volatility, but has a weaker effect on the volatility of yield changes because it implies that
the short rate mean-reverts more slowly. Since shocks to the demand factor have a weak effect on the one-year
yield, the volatility of that yield identifies κr, and the volatility of annual changes to that yield identifies σr.
The mean-reversion κβ of the demand factor βt and the magnitude parameter θ of demand shocks have their
largest effect on long-maturity yields. As with (κr, σr), the volatility of yields identifies κβ and the volatility
of annual changes to yields identifies aθ. We average volatilities across all maturities. Using volatilities at
long maturities only does not sharpen the identification.
The slope parameter α of preferred-habitat demand affects how shocks to the short rate are transmitted to
longer maturities. An increase in α weakens the transmission (Proposition 2), and this makes yield changes at
short and long maturities less correlated. Hence, the correlation between annual changes to the one-year yield
and to other yields identifies aα. (As we explain in Appendix C, however, there are important cross-effects
from aθ and to correlation and from aα to volatility.) As with (κβ , θ), we average the correlation across all
maturities
The parameters (δα, δθ) control the maturities where demand shocks originate, via the specification θ(τ) =
θ(e−δατ−e−δθτ ). Hence, they affect how volume is split across maturities. An increase in δα raises the relative
volume for short maturities and lowers that for long maturities. An increase in δθ has the same effects, with the
decline in long-maturity volume being relatively more pronounced. Hence, the relative volume for maturities
two years and below identifies δα, and the relative volume for maturities eleven years and above identifies δθ.
Our moment-matching exercise indicates slow mean-reversion for the short rate (κr = 0.125, half-life of
shocks 5.55 years) and even slower mean-reversion for the demand factor (κβ = 0.053, half-life of shocks
13.1 years). The corresponding parameters for the sub-sample of nominal yields and the sample of real yields
are two to three times larger, implying faster mean-reversion. In all samples, demand shocks originate at
short and intermediate maturities, consistent with the fact that only 9.4% of volume concerns bonds with
remaining time to maturity longer than 11 years.
Figure 1 compares the empirical moments, represented by the black crosses, to the model-generated ones,
represented by the red solid lines, for the main sample of nominal yields. Figures C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C
show the same comparisons for the sub-sample of nominal yields and the sample of real yields, respectively.
The comparisons are remarkably similar across the three figures. The figures depend only on the first seven
parameters in Table I, and not on the separate values of a and (α, θ).
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Figure 1.— Model-generated and empirical moments for the main sample of nominal yields.
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The top two panels in Figure 1 report the volatility of yields and the volatility of annual yield changes,
as functions of maturity. The model-generated moments coincide with the empirical ones for the one-year
maturity and on average, by construction. While the empirical moments are decreasing functions of maturity,
the model-generated ones are inverse hump-shaped. The inverse hump shape seems to be driven by the
independence between the short rate and the demand factor, as these factors have their largest effects at
different ends of the term structure. The middle-left panel reports the correlation between annual changes to
the one-year yield and to other yields, as function of maturity. The model-generated moments coincide with
the empirical ones on average, by construction.
The remaining panels in Figure 1 report moments not used in the calibration. The middle-right panel
reports the first principal component of annual yield changes as function of maturity, scaled to one for the
one-year maturity. The model-generated moments are close to the empirical ones, and so is the fraction of
variation explained by the first principal component (76.5% in the model and 81.3% in the data). Hence, our
calibration captures closely the empirical factor structure of yields.
The bottom two panels in Figure 1 report the coefficients of the FB and CS regressions (28) and (29),
respectively, with ∆τ = 1 (returns and yield changes are evaluated over one year). The model generates
less predictability than is found in the data, especially for long maturities. For those maturities, the model-
generated predictability, as measured by the deviation between the FB/CS coefficients and their EH value, is
about 60% of its empirical counterpart. The model-generated coefficients have the same monotonicity as in
the data. If the model is calibrated to match the FB/CS coefficients instead of the volatility of annual yield
changes, then it overshoots that volatility for long maturities, because aθ must take a larger value.
To determine the slope parameter α of preferred-habitat demand, we use KVJ’s estimates of the elasticity of
the demand for government debt. KVJ regress the yield spread between long-maturity AAA-rated corporate
bonds and government bonds on the logarithm of government debt to GDP, and find a coefficient of -0.746
(Table 1, Panel A). Hence, a 0.01 (1 bp) drop in the yield spread is associated with a 0.0134 (= 0.010.746 ) increase
in the logarithm of debt to GDP. Assuming that debt to GDP takes originally its average value, which is
43.9% in KVJ’s sample (1919-2008), it increases by 0.0059 (= 43.9%×(e0.0134−1)). To map this estimate into
our model, we interpret the increase in debt to GDP as the slope of preferred-habitat demand for government
debt. We also assume that the drop in the yield spread results from an increase in government-bond yields
across all maturities, and use GDP as the unit of account. KVJ’s estimate implies α = 5.21.
The value α = 5.21 is an upper bound for two reasons. First, instrumental-variables estimation of the
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KVJ regression generates a more negative coefficient and hence a smaller slope for preferred-habitat demand.
Second, our model takes as given the returns that preferred-habitat investors earn outside the government-
bond market (Appendix B). These returns, however, could change in equilibrium when government-bond
yields change, resulting in a lower effective demand elasticity. In the extreme case where returns outside the
government-bond market move one-to-one with government-bond yields, a change in these yields should not
affect preferred-habitat demand, resulting in an effective slope of zero. In the intermediate case where returns
outside the government-bond market adjust by x ∈ (0, 1), the effective slope is α(1− x).
For α = 5.21 and aα = 35.3, the coefficient of arbitrageur risk aversion is a = 6.78. To map a into a
coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), we recall that if arbitrageurs have wealth W and a VNM utility
function U , then a = −U ′′(W )U ′(W ) . Hence, the coefficient of RRA is γ = −U
′′(W )W
U ′(W ) = aW . The macro-finance
literature generally assumes that γ is larger than one and does not exceed ten. For γ = 2 and a = 6.78,
arbitrageur wealth is W = 29.5%, which is 29.5% of GDP since we are using GDP as the unit of account.
Such a value seems large. Suppose that we identify arbitrageurs with hedge funds, which are sophisticated
investors with relatively broad mandates. The assets of hedge funds in the fixed-income, macro and balanced
categories in the last quarter of 2019 added up to $1.2 trillion, which was 5.6% (= 1.221.42 ) of U.S. GDP in that
year.20 Smaller values of W correspond to smaller values of α since W is proportional to α holding (aα, γ)
fixed. Since smaller values seem plausible for both W and α, for separate reasons for each parameter, we use
a parameter range. We use α = 5.21 as the upper bound of the range for α, and α = 1.04 as the lower bound.
The lower bound corresponds to an x = 80% adjustment of returns outside the government-bond market to
government-bond yields.21 The upper bound α = 5.21 corresponds to an upper bound 29.5% for W and a
lower bound 6.78 for a. The lower bound α = 1.04 corresponds to a lower bound 5.9% for W and an upper
bound 33.9 for a.
5.2. Policy Analysis
The first policy that we analyze is a forward-guidance announcement about the path of short rates. We
model this announcement as a change ∆r in the long-run mean r of the short rate rt. We assume that the
change is unanticipated, takes place at time zero, and reverts deterministically to zero at a rate κr.
20See https://www.barclayhedge.com/solutions/assets-under-management/hedge-fund-assets-under-management/.
21Duffee (1998) finds that a unit drop in the Treasury bill rate causes the spread between corporate and government bonds to
rise by values ranging from 0.02 for intermediate-term AAA-rated corporate bonds to 0.42 for long-term BBB-rated bonds. An
80% adjustment of corporate-bond yields to government-bond yields (i.e., a rise in the spread by 0.2) lies within these estimates.
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Figure 2.— Effect of a forward-guidance announcement about the path of short rates, for the calibration
based on the main sample of nominal yields.
Figure 2 shows the announcement’s effect on the term structure at time zero, for the calibration based on
the main sample of nominal yields. The figures for the other two calibrations, and the equations describing
the announcement’s effect, are in Appendix C. In each panel of Figure 2, the red solid line represents the
announcement’s effect, and the red dashed line represents the same effect when arbitrageurs are risk-neutral
and the EH holds. The change ∆r is negative, i.e., the announcement is that future short rates will be lower,
and is set to -4 (-400 bps). The change reverts to zero at the rate κr = 0.1 (half-life 6.93 years) in the left
panel and κr = 0.2 (half-life 3.47 years) in the right panel. When κr = 0.1, yields are more affected because
the same is true for expected future short rates.
For both values of κr, yields under-react relative to their EH counterparts. This reflects the under-reaction
result of Proposition 2. The extent of under-reaction increases with maturity. When κr = 0.1, under-reaction
is 25.6% for the two-year yield, 35.1% for the five-year yield, 49.6% for the ten-year yield, 76.1% for the
twenty-year yield, and 102.6% for the thirty-year yield. When κr = 0.2, these numbers rise to 25.7%, 35.7%,
51.6%, 81.6%, and 111.4%, respectively. Thus, forward guidance is effective in changing yields for short
maturities, but less so for longer maturities. To engineer a decline in the ten-year yield by 0.5 (50 bps), for
example, central banks need to lower the average of expected short rates over the next ten years by about
twice as much (100 bps). The calibration based on the sample of real yields generates a similar number. The
calibration based on the sub-sample of nominal yields implies instead that the average of expected short rates
must drop by about three times as much (150 bps).
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Figure 3.— Effect of QE, for the calibration based on the main sample of nominal yields.
The second policy that we analyze is QE. We assume that QE purchases concern government bonds only,
and we model them as a decrease ∆θ0(τ) in the intercept of preferred-habitat demand. (Equation (5) defines
the demand intercept with a negative sign.) We assume that the decrease is unanticipated, takes place at
time zero, and reverts deterministically to zero at a rate κθ.
Figure 3 shows the effect of QE on the term structure at time zero, for the calibration based on the main
sample of nominal yields. The figures for the other two calibrations, and the equations describing the effect
of QE, are in Appendix C. In each panel of Figure 3, the red, green, light blue (cyan), blue and black solid
lines represent the effect of QE purchases of two-, five-, ten-, twenty- and thirty-year bonds, respectively. The
black dashed line represents the effect of QE purchases that conform to the maturity distribution used by
the Fed during QE1, as reported in D’Amico and King (2013). All lines are drawn for a change ∆θ0(τ) in
the intercept of preferred-habitat demand that satisfies
∫∞
0
∆θ0(τ)dτ = −0.12, i.e., QE purchases are 12%
of GDP. This is approximately the value of government bonds purchased by the Fed during QE1, QE2 and
QE3. The demand change mean-reverts to zero at the rate κr = 0.1 (half-life 6.93 years) in the left panel and
κr = 0.2 (half-life 3.47 years) in the right panel.
Figure 3 is the only one in this section that depends on the separate values of a and (α, θ) rather than only
on the products (aθ, aα). An increase in the coefficient of arbitrageur risk aversion a holding (aθ, aα) constant
results in a proportionate increase in the effects of QE. Relative effects across maturities do not change, i.e.,
Figure 3 looks the same after rescaling the y-axis. We use the value of a that generates the average effect
across the lower bound a = 6.78 and the upper bound a = 33.9.
A PREFERRED-HABITAT MODEL OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 41
The effects of QE on the term structure are larger when κθ = 0.1, i.e., when QE is unwound over a longer
period. Intuitively, QE lowers the yield of a bond because it lowers the risk premia that arbitrageurs require
to hold the bond. Moreover, the yield depends not only on the risk premium that arbitrageurs require in the
current instant but on an average of risk premia during the bond’s life. When QE is expected to be unwound
more slowly, risk premia in that average are impacted more.
The effects of QE have a global flavor as in Proposition 4, with some localization as in Proposition 7.
Consistent with Proposition 4, an increase in demand for bonds with longer maturities generates a larger
downward shift in the term structure. For example, the term structure shifts downward more when QE
purchases concern thirty-year bonds than when they concern two-year bonds. That downward shift, however,
is not larger across all maturities: yields for maturities ranging from one to three years are more sensitive to
purchases of two-year bonds than of thirty-year bonds. More generally, and consistent with Proposition 7, an
increase in demand for bonds with short (long) maturities has more pronounced effects at the short (long)
end of the term structure. For example, purchases of two- and five-year bonds have an effect that peaks at
short and intermediate maturities, while purchases of twenty- and thirty-year bonds have an effect that peaks
at long maturities. These features are robust to different values of κθ.
The effects of QE in Figure 3 are somewhat smaller than in the literature. Wiliams (2014) summarizes a
number of QE studies in the U.S. as suggesting that bond purchases of $600 billion by the Fed reduced the
ten-year yield by 0.15-0.25 (15-25 bps). Taking U.S. GDP at that time to be $15 trillion, the $600 billion
purchases are 4% of GDP. Hence, QE purchases of 12% of GDP should reduce the ten-year yield by 0.45-
0.75. The corresponding effect in Figure 3, in the case where the maturities of QE purchases conform to the
distribution used by the Fed during QE1, is 0.24 when κθ = 0.1 and 0.19 when κθ = 0.2. When κθ = 0.1, the
range of the effect between the upper and lower bound of α is 0.08-0.39. The calibration based on the sub-
sample of nominal yields generates the range 0.11-0.54, and that based on the sample of real yields generates
0.09-0.44.
The discrepancy between our calibrations and the estimates from QE studies could arise because some of
the observed effect of QE was due to forward guidance about the path of short rates. Additionally, arbitrageur
risk aversion during the QE period could have been larger than average because of capital losses and tighter
regulation. The latter explanation is consistent with the calibration based on the sub-sample of nominal yields
generating larger effects than the one based on the main sample.
Figure 3 suggests that central banks seeking to maximize the effects on QE on yields should concentrate
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their purchases at long maturities. Moreover, such purchases have particularly large effects on long-maturity
yields. In the extreme case where QE purchases of 12% of GDP are concentrated at the thirty-year maturity,
and where κθ = 0.1, the ten-year yield drops by 0.66 (instead of 0.24, under the maturity distribution used
by the Fed during QE1) and the thirty-year yield drops by 2.51 (instead of 0.29). Of course, it is not possible
to buy 12% of GDP worth of thirty-year bonds because their supply is below that amount.
Even less extreme tilts towards long maturities, in a way consistent with available supply, can generate
sizeable effects. The Fed’s purchases during QE1 incorporated a mild tilt: the average maturity of purchased
bonds was 6.5 years, while that of all available coupon bonds was 5.7 years. To evaluate the effects of a
stronger tilt, suppose that the Fed did not change the total value of its purchases during QE1 but bought
15% of all available supply in any given maturity before moving to a shorter maturity (hence not buying
at all short maturities). The ceiling of 15% is not overly high: D’Amico and King (2013) report that it was
exceeded for the 6-8 and 10-12 maturity buckets. Under the modified maturity distribution, QE purchases
of 12% of GDP lower the 10-year yield by 0.33 (instead of 0.24) and the thirty-year yield by 0.59 (instead of
0.29).
5.3. Unconditional Moments
To compute unconditional moments of bond returns, we must choose values for (r, θ0(τ)). We assume that
θ0(τ) is proportional to θ(τ), thus setting θ0(τ) = θ0(e
−δατ − e−δθτ ) for τ < T , and θ0(τ) = 0 for τ > T .
We determine (r, θ0) by equating empirical averages of yields to their model-generated counterparts. Since
the estimation concerns first moments, we use the longest period available in the GKS dataset: we focus on
nominal yields and start the sample from June 1961. The empirical average of the one-year yield is 5.01.
The empirical average of the seven-year yield, which is the longest maturity covered during the entire sample
period, is 5.90. Our model matches these moments when (r, aθ0) = (4.80, 289).
The model-generated average yield rises with maturity, from 5.01 for the one-year bond to 6.99 for the
thirty-year bond. The unconditional expected excess return rises with maturity as well, from 0.40% for the
one-year bond to 5.08% for the thirty-year bond. The unconditional Sharpe ratio drops from 0.320 for the
one-year bond to 0.206 for the thirty-year bond, but does so non-monotonically, by first rising until the
seven-year maturity to 0.365. The rise in expected return with maturity reflects the rise in the yield, and
is consistent with the empirical evidence. Empirical Sharpe ratios, by contrast, decline with maturity across
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the entire maturity range.22 The increase in the Sharpe ratio that our model generates for short maturities
reflects the inverse hump shape of volatility shown in Figure 1, and seems to be driven by the independence
between the short rate and the demand factor. The unconditional correlation between bond returns and
the stochastic discount factor rises from 0.842 for the one-year bond to one for the seven-year bond, and
subsequently drops to 0.563 for the thirty-year bond. The formulas for the model-generated moments are in
Appendix C.
6. CONCLUSION
We model the term structure of interest rates that results from the interaction between investors with
preferences for specific maturities and risk-averse arbitrageurs. Our model formalizes the preferred-habitat
view of the term structure and embeds it into a modern no-arbitrage framework. We use our model to study
three main questions: how shocks to the short rate, including monetary-policy actions by central banks, are
transmitted to long rates; how bond risk premia depend on the shape of the term structure; and how changes
in preferred-habitat demand, including large-scale bond purchases by central banks, affect the term structure.
We provide qualitative answers as well as quantitative ones through a calibration exercise.
Our approach can be extended in a number of directions. One direction is to derive optimal debt issuance
by governments or corporations when investors have preferences for specific maturities. Work along these lines
includes Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), Guibaud, Nosbusch, and Vayanos (2013) and Bigio, Nuno, and
Passadore (2019). Another direction is to broaden the asset-pricing implications by allowing arbitrageurs to
trade additional assets. Work along these lines includes Gourinchas, Ray, and Vayanos (2020) and Greenwood,
Hanson, Stein, and Sunderam (2020), who study the joint determination of bond prices and exchange rates. A
third direction is to analyze broader macro-economic settings, in which term-structure shifts affect investment
and output. Work along these lines includes Ray (2019), who embeds our model within a New Keynesian
framework.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof is in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Equations (21) and (22) follow from integrating the linear ODEs (19) and (20) with the initial
conditions Ar(0) = C(0) = 0. Substituting Ar(τ) from (21) into (23), we find (25). The left-hand side of (25) is increasing in
κ∗r , is zero for κ∗r = 0, and converges to infinity when κ∗r goes to infinity. The right-hand side of (25) is decreasing in κ∗r , exceeds
κr > 0 for κ∗r = 0, and converges to κr when κ∗r goes to zero. Therefore, (25) has a unique solution for κ∗r , which is positive.
Substituting C(τ) from (22) into (24), we find
κ∗rr
∗
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
]
= κrr + aσ
2
r
∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ +
aσ4r
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du
]
Ar(τ)dτ.(A.1)
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Since
κrr =κ
∗
rr
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
]
+ (κr − κ∗r)r − κ∗rraσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ,
and
(κr − κ∗r)r − κ∗rraσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
= −raσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)
2dτ − κ∗rraσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
= −raσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[
Ar(τ) + κ
∗
r
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
= −raσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)τAr(τ)dτ,
where the first step follows from (21) and (25), and the third step follows from integrating (19) from zero to τ and using (21)
and (25), we can write (A.1) as
κ∗rr
∗
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
]
= κ∗rr
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
]
Ar(τ)dτ
]
− raσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)τAr(τ)dτ
+ aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ +
aσ4r
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du
]
Ar(τ)dτ.(A.2)
Equations (21) and (A.2) imply (26). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Taking expectations conditional on time t in (8), we find
dEt(rt+τ ) = κr(r − Et(rt+τ ))dτ
⇒ Et(rt+τ ) = (1− e−κrτ )r + e−κrτ rt.(A.3)
Equation (A.3) implies
(A.4)
∂Et(rt+τ )
∂rt
= e−κrτ .
Equation (27) likewise implies
(A.5)
∂f
(τ)
t
∂rt
= A′r(τ) = e
−κ∗rτ ,
where the second step follows from (21).
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Equation (25) implies that if a > 0 and α(τ) > 0 in a positive-measure subset of (0, T ), then κ∗r > κr. Since the right-hand
side of (25) increases in a, σ2r and α(τ), and the difference between the left-hand side and the right-hand side increases in κ
∗
r ,
κ∗r increases in a, σ2r and α(τ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Equations (1), (2) and (10) imply that the dependent variable in (28) is
1
∆τ
{Ar(τ)rt + C(τ)− [Ar(τ −∆τ)rt+∆τ + C(τ −∆τ)]− [Ar(∆τ)rt + C(∆τ)]}
and the independent variable is
1
∆τ
{Ar(τ)rt + C(τ)− [Ar(τ −∆τ)rt + C(τ −∆τ)]− [Ar(∆τ)rt + C(∆τ)]} .
Therefore, the FB regression coefficient is
bFB =
Cov {[Ar(τ)−Ar(∆τ)]rt −Ar(τ −∆τ)rt+∆τ , [Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)−Ar(∆τ)]rt}
Var {[Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)−Ar(∆τ)]rt}
=
[Ar(τ)−Ar(∆τ)]Var(rt)−Ar(τ −∆τ)Cov(rt+∆τ , rt)
[Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)−Ar(∆τ)]Var(rt)
.(A.6)
Since (A.3) implies
(A.7) Cov(rt+∆τ , rt) = Var(rt)e−κr∆τ ,
we can write (A.6) as
bFB =
Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)e−κr∆τ −Ar(∆τ)
Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)−Ar(∆τ)
.
Taking the limit ∆τ → 0 and noting from (21) that Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
→ 1, we find
(A.8) bFB → A
′
r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− 1
A′r(τ)− 1
=
(κ∗r − κr)Ar(τ)
κ∗rAr(τ)
=
κ∗r − κr
κ∗r
,
where the second step follows from (19) and (25). Since κ∗r > κr when a > 0 and α(τ) > 0 in a positive-measure subset of (0, T ),
(A.8) implies bFB > 0. Since κ∗r increases in a, σ2r and α(τ), (A.8) implies that bFB increases in the same variables.
Equations (1) and (10) imply that the dependent variable in (29) is
Ar(τ −∆τ)rt+∆τ + C(τ −∆τ)
τ −∆τ −
Ar(τ)rt + C(τ)
τ
and the independent variable is
∆τ
τ −∆τ
[
Ar(τ)rt + C(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)rt + C(∆τ)
∆τ
]
.
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Therefore, the CS regression coefficient is
bCS =
Cov
{
Ar(τ−∆τ)
τ−∆τ rt+∆τ −
Ar(τ)
τ
rt,
∆τ
τ−∆τ
[
Ar(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
]
rt
}
Var
{
∆τ
τ−∆τ
[
Ar(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
]
rt
}
=
Ar(τ−∆τ)
τ−∆τ Cov(rt+∆τ , rt)−
Ar(τ)
τ
Var(rt)
∆τ
τ−∆τ
[
Ar(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
]
Var(rt)
.(A.9)
Using (A.7), we can write (A.9) as
bCS =
Ar(τ−∆τ)
τ−∆τ e
−κr∆τ − Ar(τ)
τ
∆τ
τ−∆τ
[
Ar(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
] .
Taking the limit ∆τ → 0, we find
(A.10) bCS →
Ar(τ)
τ
− [A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)]
Ar(τ)
τ
− 1
= 1− A
′
r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− 1
Ar(τ)
τ
− 1
= 1− (κ
∗
r − κr)Ar(τ)τ
τ −Ar(τ)
,
where the third step follows from (19) and (25). Since κ∗r > κr when a > 0 and α(τ) > 0 in a positive-measure subset of (0, T ),
(A.10) implies bCS < 1. Since
Ar(τ)τ
τ −Ar(τ)
=
1− e−κ∗rτ
κ∗r
(
1− 1−e−κ
∗
rτ
κ∗rτ
) ,
(A.10) implies that bCS increases in τ if the function
K(x) ≡ 1−
1−e−x
x
1− e−x =
1
1− e−x −
1
x
is increasing for x > 0. The derivative K′(x) has the same sign as the function
Kˆ(x) ≡ 1− e−x − xe− x2 .
The function Kˆ(x) is equal to zero for x = 0, and its derivative Kˆ′(x) has the same sign as e−
x
2 − 1 + x
2
which is positive for
all x. Therefore, Kˆ(x) > 0 for x > 0, and K(x) is increasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The argument in the text shows that ∆y
(τ)
t = κ
∗
r∆r
∗
∫ τ
0 Ar(u)du
τ
and ∆r∗ has the same sign as
aσ2r
∫∞
0 ∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ . Hence, when a > 0, the change ∆θ0(τ) raises all yields if
∫∞
0 ∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ > 0 and lowers them
otherwise. The relative effect across maturities is
∆y
(τ2)
t
∆y
(τ1)
t
=
∫ τ2
0 Ar(u)du
τ2∫ τ1
0 Ar(u)du
τ1
,
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and is independent of ∆θ0(τ). Since the function Ar(τ) increases in τ , the function
∫ τ
0 Ar(u)du
τ
also increases, and hence the
relative effect across maturities is larger than one for τ1 < τ2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof is in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Using the diagonalization
M = P−1Diag(ν1, ν2, .., νK+1)P,
where Diag(z1, z2, .., zN ) is the N ×N diagonal matrix with elements (z1, z2, .., zN ), and multiplying the ODE system (36) from
the left by P , we can write it as
(A.11) PA′(τ) +Diag(ν1, ν2, .., νK+1)PA(τ)− PE = 0.
Integrating (A.11) with the initial condition A(0) = 0 yields
(A.12) PA(τ) = Diag
(
1− e−ν1τ
ν1
,
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
, ..,
1− e−νK+1τ
νK+1
)
PE.
Using
Diag
(
1− e−ν1τ
ν1
,
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
, ..,
1− e−νK+1τ
νK+1
)
=
1− e−ν1τ
ν1
IK+1 +Diag
(
0,
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
, ..,
1− e−νK+1τ
νK+1
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
,
where IN is the N ×N identity matrix, we can write (A.12) as
A(τ) =
1− e−ν1τ
ν1
E+ P−1Diag
(
0,
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
, ..,
1− e−νK+1τ
νK+1
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
PE
⇒

Ar(τ)
Aβ,1(τ)
..
Aβ,K(τ)
 = 1− e−ν1τν1

1
0
..
0

+ P−1Diag
(
0,
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
, ..,
1− e−νK+1τ
νK+1
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
P

1
0
..
0
 .(A.13)
Equation (A.13) implies (39) and (40). Integrating (38) with the initial condition C(0) = 0 yields (41). Q.E.D.
We next derive the system of equations in the Laplace transforms. We consider the general case where there are K demand
factors. We assume α(τ) = αe−δατ and θk(τ) =
∑N
n=1 θk,ne
−δθnτ , where N ≥ 1, (α, δα, {θk,n}k=1,..,K, n=1,..,N , {δθn}n=1,..,N )
are scalars and (α, δα, {δθn}n=1,..,N ) are positive. We set
I ≡
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A(τ)dτ,
J ≡
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A(τ)A(τ)>dτ,
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For n = 1, .., N , we set
In ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−δθnτA(τ)dτ,
and denote by Θn the 1× (K + 1) vector (0, θ1,n, .., θK,n). Since the vectors (I, I1, .., IN ) are (K + 1)× 1, and since the matrix
J is (K + 1)× (K + 1) and symmetric, there are a total of
K + 1 +
(K + 1)(K + 2)
2
+ (K + 1)N = (K + 1)
(
K
2
+N + 2
)
distinct elements. These elements are Laplace transforms of the functions (Ar(τ), {Aβ,k(τ)}k=1,..K) and of those functions’
pairwise products. Using (J, {In}n=1,..,N , {Θn}n=1,..,N ), we can write the matrix M defined in (37) as
(A.14) M ≡ Γ> − a
∫ ∞
0
(
N∑
n=1
Θ>n I
>
n − J
)
ΣΣ>.
Lemma A.1 Suppose that α(τ) = αe−δατ and θk(τ) =
∑N
j=1 θk,ne
−δθnτ , where N ≥ 1,
(α, δα, {θk,n}k=1,..,K, n=1,..,N , {δθn}n=1,..,N ) are scalars and (α, δα, {δθn}n=1,..,N ) are positive. The (K + 1)
(
K
2
+N + 2
)
elements of (I, J, {In}n=1,..,N ) solve the system of
(A.15) (δαIK+1 +M) I =
α
δα
E,
(A.16) (δθnIK+1 +M) In =
1
δθn
E,
for n = 1, .., N , and
(A.17) (δαIK+1 +M) J + JM
> = EI> + IE>.
Proof of Lemma A.1: To derive (A.15), we multiply the ODE system (36) by α(τ) and integrate from zero to infinity. This
yields
(A.18)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A′(τ)dτ +MI −
[∫ ∞
0
α(τ)dτ
]
E = 0.
Integration by parts implies∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A′(τ)dτ = [α(τ)A(τ)]∞0 −
∫ ∞
0
α′(τ)A(τ)dτ
= lim
τ→∞α(τ)A(τ)− α(0)A(0) + δα
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A(τ)dτ
= lim
τ→∞α(τ)A(τ) + δα
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A(τ)dτ,
A PREFERRED-HABITAT MODEL OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 53
where the second step follows from α′(τ) = −δαα(τ) and the third step from A(0) = 0. Assuming limτ→∞ α(τ)A(τ) = 0, a
property that is required for the matrix M to be finite (and that holds for the solution in Theorem 1, as we show at the end of
that theorem’s proof), we find
(A.19)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A′(τ)dτ = δα
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A(τ)dτ = δαI.
Using (A.18), (A.19) and a(τ) = αe−δατ , we find (A.15).
To derive (A.16), we likewise multiply the ODE system (36) by e−δθnτ and integrate from zero to infinity. This yields
(A.20)
∫ ∞
0
e−δθnτA′(τ)dτ +MIn −
[∫ ∞
0
e−δθnτdτ
]
E = 0.
Integration by parts and a zero limit at infinity imply
(A.21)
∫ ∞
0
e−δθnτA′(τ)dτ = δθn
∫ ∞
0
e−δθnτA(τ)dτ = δθnIn.
Using (A.20) and (A.21), we find (A.16).
To derive (A.17), we multiply the ODE system (36) from the left by α(τ)A(τ)>, add to the resulting (K+1)× (K+1) matrix
its transpose, and integrate from zero to infinity. This yields
(A.22)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[
A′(τ)A(τ)> +A(τ)A′(τ)>
]
dτ +MJ + JM> − EI> − IE> = 0.
Integration by parts and a zero limit at infinity imply
(A.23)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
[
A′(τ)A(τ)> +A(τ)A′(τ)>
]
dτ = δα
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)A(τ)A(τ)>dτ = δαJ.
Using (A.22) and (A.23), we find (A.17).
The total number of equations is (K + 1)
(
K
2
+N + 2
)
, same as the number of unknown Laplace transforms: the vector
equation (A.15) yields K + 1 scalar equations, the vector equations (A.16) for n = 1, .., N yield (K + 1)N scalar equations, and
the matrix equation (A.17) yields
(K+1)(K+2)
2
scalar equations because the matrices in it are symmetric. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: The theorem specializes Lemma A.1 to the case K = 1, N = 2, θ11 = −θ12 = θ, δθ1 = δα, δθ2 = δθ,
Γ = Diag(κr, κβ) and Σ = Diag(σ
2
r , σ
2
β). Since K = 1 and N = 2, there are nine unknown Laplace transforms, which reduce to
seven because δθ1 = δα implies I1 =
I
α
. Setting I ≡ (Ir, Iβ)>, I2 ≡ (Ir,2, Iβ,2)> and
J ≡
[
Ir,r Ir,β
Ir,β Iβ,β
]
,
54 D. VAYANOS AND J.-L. VILA
the seven unknown Laplace transforms are (Ir, Iβ , Ir,2, Iβ,2, Ir,r, Ir,β , Iβ,β). Setting
∆Ir,θ ≡ θ
(
Ir
α
− Ir,2
)
− Ir,β ,(A.24)
∆Iβ,θ ≡ θ
(
Iβ
α
− Iβ,2
)
− Iβ,β ,(A.25)
we can write the matrix M given by (A.14) as
(A.26)
[
κr + aσ2rIr,r aσ
2
βIr,β
−aσ2r∆Ir,θ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
]
.
The vector equation (A.15) yields the two scalar equations(
δα + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
Ir + aσ
2
βIr,βIβ =
α
δα
,(A.27)
− aσ2r∆Ir,θIr +
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Iβ = 0.(A.28)
The vector equation (A.16) yields the two scalar equations(
δθ + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
Ir,2 + aσ
2
βIr,βIβ,2 =
1
δθ
,(A.29)
− aσ2r∆Ir,θIr,2 +
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Iβ,2 = 0.(A.30)
The matrix equation (A.17) yields the three scalar equations(
δα
2
+ κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
Ir,r + aσ
2
βI
2
r,β = Ir,(A.31)
(
δα + κr + κβ + aσ
2
rIr,r − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Ir,β + aσ
2
βIr,βIβ,β − aσ2r∆Ir,θIr,r = Iβ ,(A.32)
− aσ2r∆Ir,θIr,β +
(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Iβ,β = 0.(A.33)
Equations (A.27)-(A.32) constitute a system of seven equations in the seven unknowns (Ir, Iβ , Ir,r, Ir,β , Iβ,β , Ir,2, Iβ,2). We next
reduce this system into one of four equations in the four unknowns (Ir,r, Ir,β ,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ).
The system of (A.27) and (A.28) is linear in (Ir, Iβ) and its solution is
Ir =
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
,(A.34)
Iβ =
α
δα
aσ2r∆Ir,θ
(δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
.(A.35)
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Likewise, the system of (A.29) and (A.30) is linear in (Ir,2, Iβ,2) and its solution is
Ir,2 =
1
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δθ + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
,(A.36)
Iβ,2 =
1
δθ
aσ2r∆Ir,θ
(δθ + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
.(A.37)
Equation (A.33) is linear in Iβ,β and its solution is
(A.38) Iβ,β =
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
.
Substituting Ir from (A.34), we can write (A.31) as(
δα
2
+ κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
Ir,r + aσ
2
βI
2
r,β
−
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
= 0.(A.39)
Substituting (Ir, Ir,2) from (A.34) and (A.36), respectively, into the definition (A.24) of ∆Ir,θ, we find
∆Ir,θ −
θ
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δθ + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+ Ir,β = 0.(A.40)
Substituting (Iβ , Iβ,2, Iβ,β) from (A.34), (A.36) and (A.38), respectively, into the definition (A.25) of ∆Iβ,θ, we find
∆Iβ,θ −
θ
δα
aσ2r∆Ir,θ
(δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+
θ
δθ
aσ2r∆Ir,θ
(δθ + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
= 0.(A.41)
Substituting (Iβ , Iβ,β) from (A.34) and (A.38), respectively, we can write (A.31) as(
δα + κr + κβ + aσ
2
rIr,r − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ + aσ2β
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Ir,β − aσ2rIr,r∆Ir,θ
−
α
δα
aσ2r∆Ir,θ
(δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
= 0.(A.42)
56 D. VAYANOS AND J.-L. VILA
Equations (A.39)-(A.42) form the system of four equations in the four unknowns (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β). Given a solution to
that system, we can determine (Ir, Iβ , Ir,2, Iβ,2, Iβ,β) from (A.34)-(A.38).
To show that the system (A.39)-(A.42) has a solution, we proceed in two steps. In Step 1 we take Ir,β > 0 as given, and
construct Ir,r > 0, ∆Ir,θ > 0 and ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
uniquely from (A.39)-(A.41). In Step 2 we treat (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) as implicit
functions of Ir,β , and show that (A.42) has a solution Ir,β > 0. We denote the left-hand sides of (A.39), (A.40), (A.41) and
(A.42) by Lr,r, Lr,θ, Lβ,θ and Lr,β , respectively, and set
Dj ≡
(
δj + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
) (
δj + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
for j = α, θ. For Ir,r ≥ 0, ∆Ir,θ ≥ 0, ∆Iβ,θ < δα+κβ2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0, Dθ > Dα > 0, and hence (Lr,r, Lr,θ, Lβ,θ, Lr,β) are
continuous functions of (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β).
Step 1: We first take ∆Ir,θ ≥ 0, ∆Iβ,θ < δα+κβ2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0 as given, and construct Ir,r > 0 from (A.39). Equation (A.39)
implies
(A.43)
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
=
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r +
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r ,
which in turn implies
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
> 0 for Ir,r ≥ 0. Hence, if Lr,r < 0 for Ir,r = 0, and Lr,r > 0 for Ir,r large enough, then (A.39) has
a unique positive solution for Ir,r. Equation (A.39) implies that Lr,r converges to infinity when Ir,r goes to infinity. We assume
that (∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β) are such that Lr,r < 0 for Ir,r = 0, and return to this issue in Step 2.
We next take ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0 as given, treat Ir,r > 0 as an implicit function of (∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β), and construct
∆Ir,θ > 0 from (A.40). Equation (A.40) implies that the partial derivative of Lr,θ with respect to ∆Ir,θ when the variation of
Ir,r is taken into account is
Lˆr,θ ≡
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
.
We show that if Lr,θ = 0 for a value ∆Ir,θ > 0, then Lˆr,θ > 0 for the same value. Equation (A.40) implies
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
=
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2θ
 aσ2r ,(A.44)
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
= 1 +
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
 a2σ2rσ2βIr,β .(A.45)
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Equation (A.39) implies
(A.46)
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
=
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β .
Since ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0, (A.46) implies
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
> 0 and hence
(A.47)
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
= −
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
< 0.
Combining (A.44) and (A.45) with
θ
δj
(
δj + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2j
aσ2r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+
θ
δj
(
δj + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2j
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
=
θ
δj
(
δj + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2j
((
δj + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
aσ2r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
)
,
for j = α, θ,
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
aσ2r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β >
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
aσ2r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β ,
which follows from
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
< 0, ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
and δθ > δα,(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
aσ2r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
= −
α
δα
(
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
a3σ4rσ
2
βIr,β
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ2rIr,r +
α
δα
(
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
= a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
1−
α
δα
(
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ2rIr,r +
α
δα
(
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r
 > 0,
which follows from (A.43), (A.46) and (A.47), Dθ > Dα > 0, and
θ
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Dα
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Dθ
= ∆Ir,θ + Ir,β > 0,
which follows from Lr,θ = 0 (i.e., (A.40)), we find
(A.48) Lˆr,θ =
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
+
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
> 1 > 0.
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Since Lˆr,θ > 0 at any point where Lr,θ = 0, Lr,θ can be equal to zero only once. Hence, if Lr,θ < 0 for ∆Ir,θ = 0, and Lr,θ > 0
for ∆Ir,θ = ∆Ir,θ sufficiently large, and if all values of ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ) yield Ir,r > 0, then (A.40) yields a unique solution
for ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ). We assume that (∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β) are such that these conditions hold, and return to this issue in Step 2.
We finally take Ir,β > 0 as given, treat Ir,r > 0 and ∆Ir,θ > 0 as implicit functions of (∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β), and construct ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
from (A.41). Equation (A.41) implies that the partial derivative of Lβ,θ with respect to ∆Iβ,θ when the variation of
(Ir,r,∆Ir,θ) is taken into account is
(A.49) Lˆβ,θ ≡
∂Lβ,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
+
∂Lβ,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
+
∂Lβ,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
.
We show that if Lβ,θ = 0 for a value ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
, then Lˆβ,θ > 0 for the same value. Differentiating (A.39) and (A.40) at
the values of (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ) that render (Lr,r, Lr,θ) equal to zero, we find
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
+
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
+
∂Lr,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
= 0,(A.50)
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
+
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
+
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
= 0,(A.51)
respectively. Equations (A.50) and (A.51) form a linear system in the unknowns
(
∂Ir,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
,
∂∆Ir,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
)
. The determinant of that
system is
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
− ∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
=
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
 ∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
− ∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r

=
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
(
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
+
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Ir,r
∂∆Ir,θ
)
=
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
Lˆr,θ,
and is positive because
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
> 0 and Lˆr,θ > 0. Substituting the solution of the system (A.50)-(A.51) into (A.49), we find that
(A.49) has the same sign as the Jacobian determinant
(A.52)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
∂Lr,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
∂Lβ,θ
∂Ir,r
∂Lβ,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
∂Lβ,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The partial derivatives (
∂Lr,r
∂Ir,r
,
∂Lr,r
∂∆Ir,θ
,
∂Lr,θ
∂Ir,r
,
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
) are given by (A.43), (A.46), (A.44) and (A.45), respectively. Equations
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(A.39), (A.40) and (A.41) imply that the remaining partial derivatives are
∂Lr,r
∂∆Iβ,θ
=
α
δα
D2α
a3σ2rσ
4
βIr,β∆Ir,θ,(A.53)
∂Lr,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
=
( θ
δα
D2α
−
θ
δθ
D2θ
)
a3σ2rσ
4
βIr,β∆Ir,θ,(A.54)
∂Lβ,θ
∂Ir,r
=
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
 a2σ4r∆Ir,θ,(A.55)
∂Lβ,θ
∂∆Ir,θ
=
(
−
θ
δα
Dα
+
θ
δθ
Dθ
+
Ir,β
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
aσ2r +
( θ
δα
D2α
−
θ
δθ
D2θ
)
a3σ4rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ,(A.56)
∂Lβ,θ
∂∆Iβ,θ
= 1−
( θ
δα
(
δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r
)
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
D2θ
)
a2σ2rσ
2
β∆Ir,θ
+
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2 .(A.57)
The sign of the Jacobian determinant (A.52) does not change if we multiply the last row by
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
. The
resulting determinant does not change if we subtract the middle row times aσ2r∆Ir,θ from the last row, and then the first row
times θ
α
(
1− δαD
2
α
δθD
2
θ
)
from the middle row. In the resulting determinant, the elements (1,1), (1,2) and (1,3) are given by (A.43),
(A.46) and (A.53), respectively, the element (2,1) is given by
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2θ
 aσ2r
− θ
α
(
1− δαD
2
α
δθD
2
θ
) δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r +
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r

= −
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
(
δθ + δα + 2κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
aσ2r −
θ
α
(
1− δαD
2
α
δθD
2
θ
)(
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r
)
,
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the element (2,2) by
1 +
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
 a2σ2rσ2βIr,β
− θ
α
(
1− δαD
2
α
δθD
2
θ
) α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β = 1−
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
D2θ
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β ,
the element (2,3) by
( θ
δα
D2α
−
θ
δθ
D2θ
)
a3σ2rσ
4
βIr,β∆Ir,θ −
θ
α
(
1− δαD
2
α
δθD
2
θ
) α
δα
D2α
a3σ2rσ
4
βIr,β∆Ir,θ = 0,
the element (3,1) by
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
 a2σ4r∆Ir,θ
−
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2θ
 a2σ4r∆Ir,θ
=
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
a2σ4r∆Ir,θ,
the element (3,2) by
[(
−
θ
δα
Dα
+
θ
δθ
Dθ
+
Ir,β
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
aσ2r +
( θ
δα
D2α
−
θ
δθ
D2θ
)
a3σ4rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
](
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
−
1 +
 θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2θ
 a2σ2rσ2βIr,β
 aσ2r∆Ir,θ
= −aσ2r∆Ir,θ +
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
D2θ
a3σ4rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ −
∆Iβ,θ
∆Ir,θ
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
,
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where we use Lβ,θ = 0 (i.e., (A.41)), and the element (3,3) by[
1−
( θ
δα
(
δα + κr + aσ2rIr,r
)
D2α
−
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
D2θ
)
a2σ2rσ
2
β∆Ir,θ
](
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2 −
( θ
δα
D2α
−
θ
δθ
D2θ
)
a4σ4rσ
4
βIr,β∆I
2
r,θ
= δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ −
( θ
δα
Dα
−
θ
δθ
Dθ
)
a2σ2rσ
2
β∆Ir,θ −
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
(
δθ + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
D2θ
a2σ2rσ
2
β∆Ir,θ
+
δα
2
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2 + a2σ2rσ2βIr,β∆Ir,θδα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
= δα + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ −
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
(
δθ + κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
D2θ
a2σ2rσ
2
β∆Ir,θ +
δα
2
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2 ,
where the last step follows from Lβ,θ = 0.
For large δθ, all the terms with Dθ in the denominator are close to zero, and the determinant obtained by multiplying (A.52)
by
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
becomes∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ2rIr,r
α
δα
(
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
α
δα
D2α
a3σ2rσ
4
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+
α
δα
(
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r
− θ
α
(
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ2rIr,r
)
1 0
0 −aσ2r∆Ir,θ − ∆Iβ,θ∆Ir,θ
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
δα + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
+
δα
2
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
θ
δα
D2α
(
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r
)(
aσ2r∆Ir,θ +
∆Iβ,θ
∆Ir,θ
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
))
a3σ2rσ
4
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+
δα + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ + δα2 a2σ2rσ2βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2

 αδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r
+
(
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r
)1 + θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
 .(A.58)
To show that (A.58) is positive, and hence Lˆβ,θ > 0, we distinguish cases. When ∆Iβ,θ < 0, the only negative term in (A.58) is
the one generated by
∆Iβ,θ
∆Ir,θ
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
. We group it together with the term generated by one of the two −aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
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in
(
δα + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
and note that (A.58) exceeds
θ
δα
D2α
(
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r
)
a4σ4rσ
4
βIr,β∆I
2
r,θ
+
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ + δα2 a2σ2rσ2βIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2

 αδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)2
D2α
aσ2r
+
(
δα
2
+ κr + 2aσ
2
rIr,r
)1 + θδα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
D2α
a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β
 ,
which is positive. When instead ∆Iβ,θ ∈
(
0,
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
)
, all the terms in (A.58), with
(
δα + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
counted as a single
term, are positive. Hence, Lˆβ,θ > 0 at any point ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
where Lβ,θ = 0, which implies that Lβ,θ can be equal to zero
only once. Moreover, if Lβ,θ < 0 for ∆Iβ,θ = ∆Iβ,θ sufficiently negative, and Lβ,θ > 0 for ∆Iβ,θ =
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
, and if all values of
∆Iβ,θ ∈
(
∆Iβ,θ,
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
)
yield Ir,r > 0 and ∆Ir,θ > 0, then (A.40) yields a unique solution for ∆Iβ,θ ∈
(
∆Iβ,θ,
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
)
. We
assume that Ir,β is such that these conditions hold, and return to this issue in Step 2.
Step 2: Suppose that Ir,β > 0 satisfies
(A.59) aσ2βI
2
r,β <
α
δα
δα + κr
and define I¯r,r > 0 by
(A.60)
(
δα
2
+ κr + aσr I¯r,r
)
I¯r,r + aσ
2
βI
2
r,β −
α
δα
δα + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
= 0.
Equation (A.60) defines I¯r,r > 0 uniquely because the left-hand side increases for Ir,r ≥ 0, converges to infinity when I¯r,r goes
to infinity, and is negative for I¯r,r = 0 because of (A.59). Suppose that Ir,β satisfies additionally
Ir,β <
θ
δα
δα + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
−
θ
δθ
δθ + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
,(A.61)
aσ2βIr,β <
α
θ
.(A.62)
We can then construct Ir,r > 0, ∆Ir,θ > 0 and ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
uniquely, following the procedure in Step 1. That procedure
assumes some of the boundary conditions, which we next prove using (A.59), (A.61) and (A.62).
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Take first ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ), ∆Iβ,θ < δα+κβ2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0 as given, where ∆Ir,θ > 0 is defined by
(A.63) aσ2βI
2
r,β =
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δα + κr)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
and is positive because of (A.59). Equation (A.39) implies that for Ir,r = 0,
Lr,r = aσ
2
βI
2
r,β −
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δα + κr)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ) and (A.63). Equation (A.39) and (A.60) imply that for Ir,r = I¯r,r,
Lr,r =
(
δα
2
+ κr + aσr I¯r,r
)
I¯r,r + aσ
2
βI
2
r,β
−
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(
δα + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
) (
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
=
α
δα
δα + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
−
α
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(
δα + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
) (
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
> 0.
Hence (A.39) has a unique positive solution for Ir,r ∈ (0, I¯r,r).
Take next ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0 as given, and treat Ir,r ∈ (0, I¯r,r) as an implicit function of (∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β). For
∆Ir,θ = 0, (A.39) and (A.60) imply Ir,r = I¯r,r, and (A.40) implies
Lr,θ = −
θ
δα
δα + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
+
θ
δθ
δθ + κr + aσ2r I¯r,r
+ Ir,β < 0,
where the inequality follows from (A.61). For ∆Ir,θ = ∆Ir,θ, (A.39) and (A.63) imply Ir,r = 0, and (A.40) implies
Lr,θ = ∆Ir,θ −
θ
δα
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δα + κr)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δθ + κr)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+ Ir,β
= ∆Ir,θ −
θ
α
aσ2βI
2
r,β +
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δθ + κr)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ
+ Ir,β
> Ir,β
(
1− θ
α
aσ2βIr,β
)
> 0,(A.64)
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where the second step follows from (A.63) and the fourth from (A.62). Hence, (A.40) has a unique solution for ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ).
Take finally Ir,β > 0 as given, and treat Ir,r ∈ (0, I¯r,r) and ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ) as implicit functions of (∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β). When
∆Iβ,θ goes to minus infinity, (A.63) implies that
∆Ir,θ
δα+κβ−aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
converges to a positive limit. Since, in addition, I¯r,r is
independent of ∆Iβ,θ, Ir,r ∈ (0, I¯r,r) and ∆Ir,θ ∈ (0,∆Ir,θ), (A.41) implies that Lβ,θ converges to minus infinity. We next
determine conditions so that Lβ,θ > 0 for ∆Iβ,θ =
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
. Equations (A.40) and (A.41) imply
Lβ,θ = ∆Iβ,θ −
aσ2r(∆Ir,θ + Ir,β)∆Ir,θ
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
−
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Dθ
+
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
= ∆Iβ,θ −
aσ2r∆I
2
r,θ
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
−
θ
δθ
(δθ − δα)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Dθ
+
δα
2
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
) .
Hence, Lβ,θ > 0 for large δθ if
(A.65) ∆Iβ,θ −
aσ2r∆I
2
r,θ
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
+
δα
2
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)(
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
) > 0.
Setting ∆Iβ,θ =
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
in (A.65), we can write it as
(A.66)
δα + κβ
2aσ2β
−
aσ2r∆I
2
r,θ
δα+κβ
2
+
δα
2
aσ2rIr,β∆Ir,θ
κβ(δα+κβ)
4
> 0.
Equation (A.66) is satisfied for κβ ≈ 0. It is also satisfied for a general value of κβ if
(A.67)
δα + κβ
2aσ2β
−
aσ2r
(
θ
δθ
δθ+κr
)2
δα+κβ
2
> 0⇔ δα(δα + κr)(δα + κβ) > 2aθσrσβ ,
which follows from (A.66) by noting that (A.40) implies ∆Ir,θ <
θ
δθ
δθ+κr
. Under either κβ ≈ 0 or δα(δα+κr)(δα+κβ) > 2aθσrσβ ,
Lβ,θ > 0 for ∆Iβ,θ =
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
, and hence (A.41) has a unique solution for ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
.
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Inequalities (A.59), (A.61) and (A.62) hold for Ir,β close to zero. Consider the largest value I¯r,β such that (A.59), (A.61) and
(A.62) hold for all Ir,β < I¯r,β . The implicit function theorem ensures that the functions (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) are continuous in
Ir,β ≤ I¯r,β . For Ir,β close to zero, (A.39) and (A.40) imply that Ir,r and ∆Ir,θ are bounded away from zero. Since, in addition,
∆Iβ,θ is bounded above by
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
, (A.42) implies Lr,β < 0. We next determine a value I
∗
r,β ≥ I¯r,β such that Lr,β > 0 (and
such that (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) are well-defined and continuous in Ir,β ∈ (I¯r,β , I∗r,β ]). Continuity then ensures that a solution
Ir,β < I
∗
r,β to (A.42) exists, and hence a solution (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ, Ir,β) to the system (A.39)-(A.42) also exists.
The inequality among (A.59), (A.61) and (A.62) that switches to an equality at I¯r,β cannot be (A.59). Indeed, if (A.59)
switches to an equality at I¯r,β , then (A.60) implies I¯r,r = 0, and (A.61) becomes
(A.68) I¯r,β <
θ
δα
δα + κr
−
θ
δθ
δθ + κr
.
Multiplying (A.62) by (A.68), we find
aσ2β I¯
2
r,β <
α
δα
δα + κr
−
α
δθ
δθ + κr
<
α
δα
δα + κr
,
which implies that (A.59) holds, a contradiction.
If (A.61) switches to an equality at I¯r,β , then Lr,θ = 0 for ∆Ir,θ = 0, and hence the solution to (A.40) is ∆Ir,θ = 0. Equation
(A.42) then implies Lr,β > 0 for Ir,β = I¯r,β = I¯
∗
r,β .
Suppose instead that (A.62) switches to an equality at I¯r,β . Consider a value of Ir,β > I¯r,β =
α
θaσ2
β
such that (A.59) and
(A.61) hold. Define ∆Ir,θ > 0 by (A.63) and consider the set of ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
such that Lr,θ > 0 for ∆Ir,θ = ∆Ir,θ.
Proceeding as in (A.64) and substituting ∆Ir,θ from (A.63), we can write the condition defining that set as
α
δα
− (δα + κr)aσ2βI2r,β
a3σ2rσ
4
βI
3
r,β
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ Ir,β
(
1− θ
α
aσ2βIr,β
)
+
θ
δθ
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
(δθ + κβ)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+
α
δα
−(δα+κr)aσ2βI2r,β
aσ2
β
I2
r,β
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
) > 0.(A.69)
If (A.69) holds for all ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
, then we can proceed as in the case where (A.59), (A.61) and (A.62) hold, and construct
Ir,r > 0, ∆Ir,θ > 0 and ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
uniquely. Denote by I¯′r,β > I¯r,β the maximum value of Ir,β such that (A.69) holds for
all ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
and for all Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′r,β).
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If (A.61) switches to an equality at I¯′′r,β ∈ (I¯r,β , I¯′r,β ] and (A.59) holds for all Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′′r,β ], then (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) are
well-defined and continuous in Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′′r,β ] and Lr,β > 0 for Ir,β = I¯′′r,β = I∗r,β .
Suppose instead that (A.61) holds for all Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′r,β ]. Then (A.59) also holds for all Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′r,β ]. Indeed, if (A.59)
switches to an equality at I¯′′r,β ∈ (I¯r,β , I¯′r,β ], then (A.60) implies I¯r,r = 0, and (A.64) implies
I¯′′r,β
(
1− θ
α
aσ2β I¯
′′
r,β
)
+
θ
δθ
δθ + κβ
> 0
⇒ I¯′′r,β −
θ
α
aσ2β
(
I¯′′′r,β
)2
+
θ
δθ
δθ + κβ
> 0
⇒ I¯′′r,β −
θ
δα
δα + κβ
+
θ
δθ
δθ + κβ
> 0,(A.70)
where the first and third steps follow from (A.59) switching to an equality at I¯′′r,β . Hence, (A.61) holds in the opposite direction,
a contradiction. Since (A.59) and (A.61) hold for all Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′r,β ], (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) are well-defined and continuous in
Ir,β ∈ [I¯r,β , I¯′r,β ]. For Ir,β = I¯′r,β , (A.64) switches to an equality for a single value ∆Iβ,θ. (Since the left-hand side is convex in
∆Iβ,θ, if (A.64) switches to an equality for two values of ∆Iβ,θ, then it switches to an inequality in the opposite direction for
values of ∆Iβ,θ in-between, which contradicts the definition of I¯
′
r,β .) Suppose without loss of generality that the solution ∆Iβ,θ
is to the right of ∆Iβ,θ, in which case Lβ,θ < 0 for ∆Iβ,θ = ∆Iβ,θ. Consider a value of Ir,β > I¯
′
r,β such that (A.59) and (A.61)
hold, and denote by ∆Iβ,θ the minimum value of ∆Iβ,θ such that (A.69) holds for all ∆Iβ,θ ∈
(
∆Iβ,θ,
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
)
. Proceeding
as in the case where (A.59), (A.61) and (A.62) hold, we can construct Ir,r > 0, ∆Ir,θ > 0 and ∆Iβ,θ ∈
(
∆Iβ,θ,
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
)
uniquely. Consider the largest value I¯′′′r,β > I¯
′
r,β such that for all Ir,β ∈ [I¯′r,β , I¯′′′r,β), (A.59) and (A.61) hold and Lβ,θ < 0 for
∆Iβ,θ = ∆Iβ,θ. The functions (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) are well-defined and continuous in Ir,β ∈ (I¯′r,β , I¯′′′r,β ]. The same argument as
in (A.70) implies that the inequality among (A.59), (A.61) and Lβ,θ < 0 for ∆Iβ,θ = ∆Iβ,θ that switches to an equality at
I¯′′′r,β cannot be (A.59). If (A.61) switches to an equality at I¯
′′′
r,β , then Lr,β > 0 for Ir,β = I¯
′′′
r,β = I
∗
r,β . If instead, Lβ,θ = 0 for
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∆Iβ,θ = ∆Iβ,θ, then (Ir,r,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ) = (0,∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ). Hence,
Lr,β =
(
δα + κr + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ + aσ2β
aσ2r I¯
′′′
r,β∆Ir,θ
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
I′′′r,β
−
α
δα
aσ2r∆Ir,θ
(δα + κr)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βI
′′′
r,β∆Ir,θ
>
(
δα + κr + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ + aσ2β
aσ2r I¯
′′′
r,β∆Ir,θ
δα
2
+ κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
I′′′r,β
−
θ
δα
a2σ2rσ
2
β∆Ir,θI
′′′
r,β
(δα + κr)
(
δα + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βI
′′′
r,β∆Ir,θ
= (δα + κr + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ)I′′′r,β −
θ
δθ
a2σ2rσ
2
βI
′′′
r,β∆Ir,θ
(δθ + κr)
(
δθ + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βI
′′′
r,β∆Ir,θ
,
where the first step follows from I′′′r,β > I¯r,β =
α
θaσ2
β
and the second step from (A.41). For large δθ, Lr,β > 0 if
(A.71) δα + κr + κβ − 2aσ2β∆Iβ,θ > 0,
which holds because ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
. Hence, Ir,β = I¯
′′′
r,β = I
∗
r,β . The solution satisfies Ir,r > 0, ∆Ir,θ > 0, ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
and
Ir,β > 0. Combining these inequalities with (A.26), we find M1,1 > κr, M1,2 > 0, M2,1 < 0 and M2,2 >
κβ−δα
2
.
To complete the existence proof, we show that the integrals in the Laplace transforms (Ir, Iβ , Ir,r, Ir,β , Iβ,β , Ir,2, Iβ,2) con-
verge. That property is assumed when performing the integration by parts in Lemma A.1. Since δθ > δα, the Laplace-transform
integrals converge if the real parts of the eigenvalues of M exceed − δα
2
. Using (A.26), we find that the characteristic polynomial
of M is
(A.72) P (λ) =
(
κr + aσ
2
rIr,r − λ
) (
κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ − λ
)
+ a2σ2rσ
2
βIr,β∆Ir,θ.
Since Ir,r > 0, ∆Ir,θ > 0, ∆Iβ,θ <
δa+κβ
2aσ2
β
and Ir,β > 0, P (λ) > 0 for all λ < − δα2 . Hence, if the eigenvalues are real, they must
exceed − δα
2
. If the eigenvalues are complex, their real part is
κr + aσ2rIr,r + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
2
and exceeds − δα
2
because Ir,r > 0 and ∆Iβ,θ <
δα+κβ
2aσ2
β
. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5: Using K = 1 and (A.26), we can write the system (36) as
A′r(τ) +
(
κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
Ar(τ) + aσ
2
βIr,βAβ(τ)− 1 = 0,(A.73)
A′β(τ)− aσ2r∆Ir,θAr(τ) +
(
κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
Aβ(τ) = 0,(A.74)
and the solution to that system, given in Lemma 3, as
Ar(τ) =
1− e−ν1τ
ν1
+ φr
(
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
,(A.75)
Aβ(τ) = φβ
(
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1− e
−ν1τ
ν1
)
.(A.76)
Equations (A.73) and (A.74), together with the initial conditions Ar(0) = Aβ(0) = 0, imply A
′
r(0) = 1 and A
′
β(0) = 0.
Differentiating (A.74) at zero and using ∆Ir,θ > 0, which follows from M2,1 < 0 and (A.26), we find A
′′
β(0) > 0. Hence,
Ar(τ) > 0, A′β(τ) > 0 and Aβ(τ) > 0 for small τ .
Suppose that the two eigenvalues of M are real, and without loss of generality set ν1 > ν2. Since the function (ν, τ) −→ 1−e
−ντ
ν
decreases in ν, the term in parenthesis in (A.76) is positive. Since, in addition, Aβ(τ) > 0 for small τ , φβ > 0 and hence Aβ(τ) > 0
for all τ . Since
A′β(τ) = φβ
(
e−ν2τ − e−ν1τ )
and φβ > 0, A
′
β(τ) > 0. Since
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
=
1−e−ν1τ
ν1
φβ
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1−e−ν1τ
ν1
) + φr
φβ
=
1
φβ
(
ν1
ν2
1−e−ν2τ
1−e−ν1τ − 1
) + φr
φβ
,
and the function (ν1, ν2, τ) −→ 1−e
−ν2τ
1−e−ν1τ increases in τ because its derivative has the same sign as
eν1τ−1
ν1
− eν2τ−1
ν2
,
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
< 0.
Since
A′r(τ) = e
−ν1τ + φr
(
e−ν2τ − e−ν1τ ) ,
the sign of A′r(τ) can change at most once. Hence, A′r(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ′) and A′r(τ) < 0 for τ ∈ (τ¯ ′,∞), where τ¯ ′ is a
threshold in (0,∞]. The function Ar(τ) has the same behavior for a different threshold τ¯ .
When a ≈ 0, Ar(τ) > 0 because Lemma A.2 implies φr ≈ 0, ν1 ≈ κr > 0 and ν2 ≈ κβ > 0. When α(τ) = 0, Ir,r = Ir,β = 0,
and hence (A.73) implies Ar(τ) =
1−e−κrτ
κr
> 0. In both cases, τ¯ = ∞. When a ≈ ∞, Lemma A.2 implies that for τ bounded
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away from zero
Ar(τ) ≈ 1
a
1
3
(
1
n1
+ cr
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
)
=
1
a
1
3 n1
1− ∫∞0 α(τ ′) 1−e−ν2τ
′
ν2
dτ ′∫∞
0 α(τ
′)
(
1−e−ν2τ′
ν2
)2
dτ ′
1− e−ν2τ
ν2

=
1
a
1
3 n1
∫∞
0 α(τ
′)(1− e−ν2τ ′ )(e−ν2τ − e−ν2τ ′ )dτ ′∫∞
0 α(τ
′)(1− e−ν2τ ′ )2dτ ′ .
Since this is negative for τ close to ∞, τ¯ <∞.
Suppose that the two eigenvalues of M are complex. Since they are conjugates, we set ν1 = µ + iξ and ν2 = µ − iξ for real
numbers (µ, ξ). Equations (A.75) and (A.76) imply that (Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) take the form
Ar(τ) = φr,0 + φr,1e
−µτ cos(ξτ) + φr,2e−µτ sin(ξτ),(A.77)
Aβ(τ) = φβ,0 + φβ,1e
−µτ cos(ξτ) + φβ,2e−µτ sin(ξτ),(A.78)
for real numbers {φj,n}j=r,β, n=0,1,2. Since the initial conditions Ar(0) = Aβ(0) = 0 imply φj,0 +φj,1 = 0 for j = r, β, condition
A′r(0) = 1 implies −φr,1µ+ φr,2ξ = 1, and condition A′β(0) = 0 implies −φβ,1µ+ φβ,2ξ = 0, we can write (A.77) and (A.78) as
Ar(τ) = φr,0
[
1− µ
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ)− e−µτ cos(ξτ)
]
+
1
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ),(A.79)
Aβ(τ) = φβ,0
[
1− µ
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ)− e−µτ cos(ξτ)
]
.(A.80)
Differentiating (A.79) and (A.80), we find
A′r(τ) = φr,0
µ2 + ξ2
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ) + e−µτ
[
cos(ξτ)− µ
ξ
sin(ξτ)
]
,(A.81)
A′β(τ) = φβ,0
µ2 + ξ2
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ).(A.82)
Since A′β(τ) > 0 for small τ , φβ,0 > 0, and hence A
′
β(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, pi|ξ| ). The derivative
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
has the same sign as
A′r(τ)Aβ(τ)−Ar(τ)A′β(τ)
= e−µτ
[
cos(ξτ)− µ
ξ
sin(ξτ)
]
φβ,0
[
1− µ
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ)− e−µτ cos(ξτ)
]
− 1
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ)φβ,0
µ2 + ξ2
ξ
e−µτ sin(ξτ)
= φβ,0e
−µτ
[
cos(ξτ)− µ
ξ
sin(ξτ)− e−µτ
]
,(A.83)
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where the second step follows from (A.79)-(A.82) and the third by rearranging. Since φβ,0 > 0,
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
is negative if the term
in brackets in (A.83) is negative. That term is concave in µ and is maximized for µ given by
−1
ξ
sin(ξτ) + τe−µτ = 0⇔ e−µτ = sin(ξτ)
ξτ
.
The maximum is
(A.84) cos(ξτ)− sin(ξτ)
ξτ
[
1− log
(
sin(ξτ)
ξτ
)]
= H(ξτ)
sin(ξτ)
ξτ
,
where
H(x) ≡ x cos(x)
sin(x)
− 1 + log
(
sin(x)
x
)
.
The function H(x) is equal to zero for x = 0, and its derivative is
H′(x) = − x
sin2(x)
+
cos(x)
sin(x)
+
x cos(x)−sin(x)
x2
sin(x)
x
= −x
2 − 2x cos(x) sin(x) + sin2(x)
x sin2(x)
.
Since
x2 − 2x cos(x) sin(x) + sin2(x) > x2 − 2|x sin(x)|+ sin2(x) = (|x| − | sin(x)|)2 > 0
for x 6= 0, H′(x) > 0 for x < 0, and H′(x) < 0 for x > 0. Since, in addition, H(0) = 0, H(x) < 0. Hence, the maximum (A.84)
is negative for τ ∈ (0, pi|ξ| ), and so is
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
. This establishes the results in the proposition for A′β(τ) and
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
and for the
threshold τˆ = pi|ξ| . The result for Aβ(τ) and for a threshold τ¯ > τˆ follows because Aβ(0) = 0 and A
′
β(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, τˆ) imply
Aβ(τ) > 0 for τ ∈ (0, τˆ ].
If τ¯ < ∞, then Aβ(τ¯) = 0 and A′β(τ¯) ≤ 0. If A′β(τ¯) < 0, then ∆Ir,θ > 0 and (A.74) imply Ar(τ¯) < 0. If A′β(τ¯) = 0, then
∆Ir,θ > 0 and (A.74) imply Ar(τ¯) = 0, and (A.74) implies A
′
r(τ¯) = 1. Hence, in both cases, Ar(τ) < 0 for τ smaller than and
close to τ¯ . This yields the result in the proposition for Ar(τ) and for a threshold τ¯ < τ¯ . Q.E.D.
Lemma A.2 derives the asymptotic behavior of (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) when a ≈ 0 and a ≈ ∞. To state and prove the lemma, we
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define the functions
F (ν, ν′) ≡
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
1− e−ντ
ν
1− e−ν′τ
ν′
dτ,
Fˆ (ν, ν′) ≡ F (ν, ν′)− F (ν, ν),
ˆˆ
F (ν, ν′) ≡ F (ν, ν) + F (ν′, ν′)− 2F (ν, ν′),
G(ν) ≡
∫ ∞
0
θ(τ)
1− e−ντ
ν
dτ,
Gˆ(ν, ν′) ≡ G(ν′)−G(ν).
We also note that the definitions of (J, Ir,r, Ir,β) imply
Ir,r =
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)
2dτ,(A.85)
Ir,β =
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ.(A.86)
Lemma A.2 Suppose that there is one demand factor, the matrices (Γ,Σ) are diagonal, and α(τ) and
θ(τ)
τ
have a positive and
a finite limit, respectively, at τ = 0. The asymptotic behavior of (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) when a ≈ 0 and a ≈ ∞ is as follows:
• When a ≈ 0, (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) ≈ (κr, κβ , a3cr, acβ), where
cr = −
c2βσ
2
β Fˆ (κr, κβ)
κr − κβ
,(A.87)
cβ =
σ2rG(κr)
κr − κβ
.(A.88)
• When a ≈ ∞, (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) ≈ (a
1
3 n1, ν2, a
− 1
3 cr, φβ), where
n1 = σ
2
3
r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)dτ −
[∫∞
0 α(τ)
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ
]2
∫∞
0 α(τ)
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ

1
3
> 0.(A.89)
cr = − 1
n1
∫∞
0 α(τ)
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ∫∞
0 α(τ)
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ
< 0,(A.90)
φβ =
∫∞
0 θ(τ)
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ∫∞
0 α(τ)
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ
,(A.91)
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and ν2 solves
(A.92)
∫∞
0 θ(τ)
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ∫∞
0 θ(τ)dτ
=
∫∞
0 α(τ)
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ∫∞
0 α(τ)
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ
.
Proof: Substituting (A.75) and (A.76) into (A.73) and identifying terms in 1−e
−ν1τ
ν1
and
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
− 1−e−ν1τ
ν1
)
, we find
φr(ν1 − ν2)− ν1 + κr + aσ2rIr,r = 0,(A.93)
− φrν2 + φr
(
κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
+ φβaσ
2
βIr,β = 0,(A.94)
respectively. Using (A.93), we can write (A.94) as
(A.95) φr(1− φr)(ν1 − ν2) + φβaσ2βIr,β = 0.
Substituting (A.75) and (A.76) into (A.74) and identifying terms, we find
φβ(ν1 − ν2)− aσ2r∆Ir,θ = 0,(A.96)
− φβν2 − φr∆Ir,θ + φβ
(
κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ
)
= 0,(A.97)
respectively. Using (A.96), we can write (A.97) as
(A.98) −ν2 − φr(ν1 − ν2) + κβ − aσ2β∆Iβ,θ = 0.
Equations (A.93), (A.95), (A.96) and (A.98) constitute a system of four equations in the four unknowns (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ).
Substituting (A.75) and (A.76) into the definitions (A.85), (A.86), (A.24) and (A.25) of (Ir,r, Ir,β , ∆Ir,θ,∆Iβ,θ), we can write
that system as
φr(ν1 − ν2)− ν1 + κr + aσ2r
[
F (ν1, ν1) + 2φrFˆ (ν1, ν2) + φ
2
r
ˆˆ
F (ν1, ν2)
]
= 0,(A.99)
φr(1− φr)(ν1 − ν2) + φ2βaσ2β
[
Fˆ (ν1, ν2) + φr
ˆˆ
F (ν1, ν2)
]
= 0,(A.100)
φβ(ν1 − ν2)− aσ2r
[
G(ν1) + φrGˆ(ν1, ν2)− φβ
[
Fˆ (ν1, ν2) + γr
ˆˆ
F (ν1, ν2)
]]
= 0,(A.101)
− ν2 − φr(ν1 − ν2) + κβ − φβaσ2β
[
Gˆ(ν1, ν2)− φβ ˆˆF (ν1, ν2)
]
= 0.(A.102)
Suppose that a ≈ 0. Setting (φr, φβ) = (a3cr, acβ), we can write (A.99)-(A.102) as
a3cr(ν1 − ν2)− ν1 + κr + aσ2r
[
F (ν1, ν1) + 2a
3crFˆ (ν1, ν2) + a
6c2r
ˆˆ
F (ν1, ν2)
]
= 0,(A.103)
cr(1− a3cr)(ν1 − ν2) + c2βσ2β
[
Fˆ (ν1, ν2) + a
3cr
ˆˆ
F (ν1, ν2)
]
= 0,(A.104)
cβ(ν1 − ν2)− σ2r
[
G(ν1) + a
3crGˆ(ν1, ν2)− acβ
[
Fˆ (ν1, ν2) + a
3cr
ˆˆ
F (ν1, ν2)
]]
= 0,(A.105)
− ν2 − a3cr(ν1 − ν2) + κβ − a2cβσ2β
[
Gˆ(ν1, ν2)− acβ ˆˆF (ν1, ν2)
]
= 0.(A.106)
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The asymptotic behavior of (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) is as in the lemma if (A.103)-(A.106) has a non-zero solution (ν1, ν2, cr, cβ) for a = 0.
For a = 0, (A.103) implies ν1 = κr, (A.106) implies ν2 = κβ , (A.105) implies cβ = cβ and (A.104) implies cr = cr.
Suppose that a ≈ ∞. Setting (ν1, φr) = (a 13 n1, a− 13 cr), we can write (A.99)-(A.102) as
a−
2
3 cr
(
a
1
3 n1 − ν2
)
− n1 + a− 13 κr + a 23 σ2r
[
F
(
a
1
3 n1, a
1
3 n1
)
+ 2a−
1
3 crFˆ
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)
+ a−
2
3 c2r
ˆˆ
F
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)]
= 0,(A.107)
a−1cr(1− a− 13 cr)
(
a
1
3 n1 − ν2
)
+ a
1
3 φ2βσ
2
β
[
Fˆ
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)
+ a−
1
3 cr
ˆˆ
F
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)]
= 0,(A.108)
a−
2
3 φβ
(
a
1
3 n1 − ν2
)
− a 13 σ2r
[
G
(
a
1
3 n1
)
+ a−
1
3 crGˆ
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)
− φβ
[
Fˆ
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)
+ a−
1
3 cr
ˆˆ
F
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)]]
= 0,(A.109)
a−1
[
−ν2 − a− 13 cr
(
a
1
3 n1 − ν2
)
+ κβ
]
− φβσ2β
[
Gˆ
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)
− φβ ˆˆF
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)]
= 0.(A.110)
The asymptotic behavior of (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) is as in the lemma if (A.113)-(A.110) has a non-zero solution (n1, ν2, cr, φβ) for
a =∞. Noting that
lim
a→∞ a
2
3 F
(
a
1
3 n1, a
1
3 n1
)
=
1
n21
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)dτ,
lim
a→∞ a
1
3 F
(
a
1
3 n1, ν2
)
=
1
n1
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ,
lim
a→∞ a
1
3G
(
a
1
3 n1
)
=
1
n1
∫ ∞
0
θ(τ)dτ,
we can write (A.113)-(A.110) for a =∞ as
n1 − σ2r
[
1
n21
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)dτ + 2cr
1
n1
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ + c2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ
]
= 0,(A.111)
1
n1
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ + cr
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ = 0,(A.112)
1
n1
∫ ∞
0
θ(τ)dτ + cr
∫ ∞
0
θ(τ)
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ − φβ
[
1
n1
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ + cr
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ
]
= 0,(A.113)
∫ ∞
0
θ(τ)
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
dτ − φβ
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−ν2τ
ν2
)2
dτ = 0.(A.114)
Equations (A.112) and (??) imply (A.92). Equation (A.92) has a solution ν2. Indeed, when ν2 goes to infinity, the left-hand side
is
1
ν2
[
1−
∫∞
0 θ(τ)e
−ν2τdτ∫∞
0 θ(τ)dτ
]
=
1
ν2
[
1 + o
(
1
ν2
)]
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because
θ(τ)
τ
has a finite limit at zero, and the right-hand side is
1
ν2
[
1−
∫∞
0 α(τ)(1− e−ν2τ )e−ν2τdτ∫∞
0 α(τ)(1− e−ν2τ )dτ
]
=
1
ν2
[
1− α(0)
ν2
∫∞
0 α(τ)dτ
+ o
(
1
ν2
)]
because α(τ) has a positive limit at zero. Hence, the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side. When (α(τ), {θk(τ)}k=1,..,K)
become zero for τ larger than a finite threshold T , and ν2 goes to minus infinity, the left-hand side is
e−ν2T
ν2
∫∞
0 θ(τ)
[
eν2T − eν2(T−τ)] dτ∫∞
0 θ(τ)dτ
=
e−ν2T
ν22
θ(T )∫∞
0 θ(τ)dτ
+ o
(
1
ν22
)
,
and is smaller than the right-hand side, which is
e−ν2T
ν2
∫∞
0 α(τ)
[
eν2T − eν2(T−τ)]2 dτ∫∞
0 α(τ)
[
eν2T − eν2(T−τ)] dτ = e−ν2T−2ν2 + o
(
1
ν2
)
.
Hence, a solution ν2 ∈ (−∞,∞) to (A.92) exists. When T = ∞, (α(τ), θ(τ)) ≈ (αe−δατ , θe−δ′ατ ) for τ large and for 0 <
δα ≤ δ′α. When ν2 goes to − δα2 , the right-hand side goes to infinity, while the left-hand side remains finite. Hence, a solution
ν2 ∈
(
− δα
2
,∞
)
to (A.92) exists.
Using (A.112) to eliminate cr in (A.111), we find n1 = n1. Equations (A.112) and (A.114) imply cr = cr and φβ = φβ ,
respectively. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies n1 > 0, and hence cr < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3, we find that the FB regression coefficient is
bFB =
NFB,rVar(rt) +NFB,βVar(βt)
[Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)−Ar(∆τ)]2 Var(rt) +
[
Aβ(τ)−Aβ(τ −∆τ)
]2
Var(βt)
=
NFB,r
σ2r
κr
+NFB,β
σ2β
κβ
[Ar(τ)−Ar(τ −∆τ)−Ar(∆τ)]2 σ
2
r
κr
+
[
Aβ(τ)−Aβ(τ −∆τ)
]2 σ2β
κβ
,(A.115)
where
NFB,j =
[
Aj(τ)−Aj(τ −∆τ)e−κj∆τ −Aj(∆τ)
]
[Aj(τ)−Aj(τ −∆τ)−Aj(∆τ)]
for j = r, β. Taking the limit in (A.115) when ∆τ → 0, and noting from (A.75) and (A.76) that Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
→ 1 and Aβ(∆τ)
∆τ
→ 0,
we find
(A.116) bFB =
[A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− 1] [A′r(τ)− 1] σ
2
r
κr
+
[
A′β(τ) + κβAβ(τ)
]
A′β(τ)
σ2β
κβ
[A′r(τ)− 1]2 σ
2
r
κr
+A′β(τ)2
σ2
β
κβ
.
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For τ < min{τ¯ , τˆ}, Ar(τ) > 0, Aβ(τ) > 0 and A′β(τ) > 0. Moreover, (A.73) implies
A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− 1 = −aσ2rIr,rAr(τ)− aσ2βIr,βAβ(τ) ≤ 0,(A.117)
A′r(τ)− 1 = −
(
κr + aσ
2
rIr,r
)
Ar(τ)− aσ2βIr,βAβ(τ) < 0,(A.118)
where the inequalities follow from Ar(τ) > 0, Aβ(τ) > 0, Ir,r ≥ 0 and Ir,β ≥ 0, which in turn follows from M1,2 ≥ 0 and (A.26).
Equations (A.116), Aβ(τ) > 0, A
′
β(τ) > 0, (A.117) and (A.118) imply bFB > 0.
When a ≈ 0, (A.75), (A.76) and (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) ≈ (κr, κβ , a3cr, acβ) (Lemma A.2) imply
bFB =
ν1−κr
ν1
(1− e−κrτ )2 σ
2
r
κr
+ a2c2β
[
L′β(τ) + κβLβ(τ)
]
L′β(τ)
σ2β
κβ
(1− e−κrτ )2 σ2r
κr
+ a2c2βL
′
β(τ)
2
σ2
β
κβ
+ o(a2),
where
Lβ(τ) ≡
1− e−κβτ
κβ
− 1− e
−κrτ
κr
.
Since Lβ(τ)L
′
β(τ) > 0, and (A.85) and (A.93) imply
(A.119) ν1 − κr = aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−κrτ
κr
)2
dτ + o(a2),
bFB > 0.
When a ≈ ∞, (A.75), (A.76) and (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) ≈ (a
1
3 n1, ν2, a
− 1
3 cr, φβ) (Lemma A.2) imply that for τ bounded away from
zero
(A.120) bFB =
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
β
(
e−ν2τ + κβ 1−e
−ν2τ
ν2
)
e−ν2τ
σ2β
κβ
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βe
−2ν2τ σ
2
β
κβ
+ o(1) = 1 +
φ
2
β
1−e−ν2τ
ν2
e−ν2τσ2β
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βe
−2ν2τ σ
2
β
κβ
+ o(1).
Hence, bFB > 1. We next show that bFB increases in τ if (43) holds. Equation (43) implies that the left-hand side of (A.92)
exceeds the right-hand side for ν2 = 0, and hence (A.92) has a solution ν2 < 0. We write (A.120) as
(A.121) bFB = 1 +
φ
2
βNFB(τ)σ
2
β
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDFB(τ)
σ2
β
κβ
+ o(1),
where
NFB(τ) ≡ e
2zτ − ezτ
z
,
DFB(τ) ≡ e2zτ ,
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and z ≡ −ν2 > 0, and consider the derivative φ2βNFB(τ)σ2β
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDFB(τ)
σ2
β
κβ

′
=
σ2r
κr
φ
2
βσ
2
βN
′
FB(τ) + φ
4
β
σ4β
κβ
[N ′FB(τ)DFB(τ)−NFB(τ)D′FB(τ)][
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDFB(τ)
σ2
β
κβ
]2 .
Since [
NFB(τ)
DFB(τ)
]′
=
[
1− e−zτ
z
]′
= e−zτ > 0,
N ′FB(τ)DFB(τ)−NFB(τ)D′FB(τ) > 0. Since, in addition,
N ′FB(τ) = 2e
2zτ − ezτ > 0,
bFB increases in τ .
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3, we find that the CS regression coefficient is
bCS =
NCS,rVar(rt) +NCS,βVar(βt)
∆τ
τ−∆τ
{[
Ar(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
]2
Var(rt) +
[
Aβ(τ)
τ
− Aβ(∆τ)
∆τ
]2
Var(βt)
}
=
NCS,r
σ2r
κr
+NCS,β
σ2β
κβ
∆τ
τ−∆τ
{[
Ar(τ)
τ
− Ar(∆τ)
∆τ
]2 σ2r
κr
+
[
Aβ(τ)
τ
− Aβ(∆τ)
∆τ
]2 σ2
β
κβ
} ,(A.122)
where
NCS,j =
[
Aj(τ −∆τ)
τ −∆τ e
−κj∆τ − Aj(τ)
τ
] [
Aj(τ)
τ
− Aj(∆τ)
∆τ
]
for j = r, β. Taking the limit in (A.122) when ∆τ → 0, we find
bCS →
[
Ar(τ)
τ
− [A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)]
] [
Ar(τ)
τ
− 1
]
σ2r
κr
+
[
Aβ(τ)
τ
−
[
A′β(τ) + κβAβ(τ)
]]
Aβ(τ)
τ
σ2β
κβ[
Ar(τ)
τ
− 1
]2 σ2r
κr
+
[
Aβ(τ)
τ
]2 σ2
β
κβ
= 1−
[A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− 1]
[
Ar(τ)
τ
− 1
]
σ2r
κr
+
[
A′β(τ) + κβAβ(τ)
]
Aβ(τ)
τ
σ2β
κβ[
Ar(τ)
τ
− 1
]2 σ2r
κr
+
[
Aβ(τ)
τ
]2 σ2
β
κβ
.(A.123)
For τ < min{τ¯ , τˆ}, Aβ(τ) > 0, A′β(τ) > 0, and (A.117) and (A.118) hold. Equation (A.118) and the initial condition Ar(0) = 0
imply Ar(τ)− τ < 0. Equations (A.9), Aβ(τ) > 0, A′β(τ) > 0, (A.117) and Ar(τ)− τ < 0 imply bCS < 1.
When a ≈ 0, (A.75), (A.76), (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) ≈ (κr, κβ , a3cr, acβ) (Lemma A.2) and (A.119) imply
bCS = 1− a
σ2r
(
1− e−κrτ )
κr
(
1− 1−e−κrτ
κrτ
) ∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(
1− e−κrτ
κr
)2
dτ + o(a).
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Hence, bCS is smaller than and close to one. Moreover, bCS increases in τ because the function K(x) defined in Proposition 3 is
increasing for x > 0.
When a ≈ ∞, (A.75), (A.76) and (ν1, ν2, φr, φβ) ≈ (a
1
3 n1, ν2, a
− 1
3 cr, φβ) (Lemma A.2) imply that for τ bounded away from
zero
(A.124) bCS = 1−
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
β
(
e−ν2τ + κβ 1−e
−ν2τ
ν2
)
1−e−ν2τ
ν2τ
σ2β
κβ
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
β
(
1−e−ν2τ
ν2τ
)2 σ2
β
κβ
+ o(1).
Hence, bCS < 1. We next show that bCS is negative and decreasing in τ if (43) holds. We write (A.124) as
(A.125) bCS = 1−
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βNCS(τ)
σ2β
κβ
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDCS(τ)
σ2
β
κβ
+ o(1),
where
NCS(τ) ≡
(
ezτ + κβ
ezτ − 1
z
)
ezτ − 1
zτ
,
DCS(τ) ≡
(
ezτ − 1
zτ
)2
,
and z ≡ −ν2 > 0. Equation (A.125) implies
(A.126) bCS = −
φ
2
β [NCS(τ)−DCS(τ)]
σ2β
κβ
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDCS(τ)
σ2
β
κβ
+ o(1).
Since
NCS(τ)−DCS(τ) =
[
ezτ +
(
κβ −
1
τ
)
ezτ − 1
z
]
ezτ − 1
zτ
>
[
ezτ − e
zτ − 1
zτ
]
ezτ − 1
zτ
=
zτezτ − ezτ + 1
zτ
ezτ − 1
zτ
and xex − ex + 1 > 0 for all x, (A.126) implies bCS < 0. Consider next the derivative
 σ
2
r
κr
+ φ
2
βNCS(τ)
σ2β
κβ
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDCS(τ)
σ2
β
κβ

′
=
σ2r
κr
φ
2
β
σ2β
κβ
[N ′CS(τ)−D′CS(τ)] + φ4β
σ4β
κ2
β
[N ′CS(τ)DCS(τ)−NCS(τ)D′CS(τ)][
σ2r
κr
+ φ
2
βDCS(τ)
σ2
β
κβ
]2 .
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Since
N ′CS(τ)−D′CS(τ) =
[
zezτ +
(
κβ −
1
τ
)
ezτ +
ezτ − 1
zτ2
]
ezτ − 1
zτ
+
[
ezτ +
(
κβ −
1
τ
)
ezτ − 1
z
]
z2τezτ − z (ezτ − 1)
z2τ2
>
z2τ2ezτ − zτezτ + ezτ − 1
zτ2
ezτ − 1
zτ
+
zτezτ − ezτ + 1
zτ
zτezτ − ezτ + 1
zτ2
and x2ex − xex + ex − 1 > 0 for all x, N ′CS(τ)−D′CS(τ) > 0. Since[
NCS(τ)
DCS(τ)
]′
=
[
zτezτ
ezτ − 1
]′
= zezτ
(1 + zτ) (ezτ − 1)− zτezτ
(ezτ − 1)2 = ze
zτ e
zτ − 1− zτ
(ezτ − 1)2
and ex − 1− x > 0 for all x, N ′CS(τ)DCS(τ)−NCS(τ)D′CS(τ) > 0. Hence, bCS decreases in τ . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: Substituting C(τ) from (41) into (42), using Γ = Diag(κr, κβ) and Σ = Diag(σ
2
r , σ
2
β), and dropping
the subscript 1 from functions of the single demand factor, we find
χr = κrr + aσ
2
r
[∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ
− χr
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ − χβ
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
+
σ2r
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du
)
Ar(τ)dτ +
σ2β
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)
2du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
,(A.127)
χβ = aσ
2
β
[∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ
− χr
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ − χβ
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
+
σ2r
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ +
σ2β
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)
2du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
.(A.128)
The system of (A.127) and (A.128) is linear in (χr, χβ) and its solution is
χr =
1
D
{[
κrr + aσ
2
r
∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ + Cr
] [
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
−
[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ + Cβ
] [
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]}
,(A.129)
χβ =
1
D
{[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ + Cβ
] [
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
−
[
κrr + aσ
2
r
∫ ∞
0
θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ + Cr
] [
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]}
,(A.130)
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where
D ≡
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
] [
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
−
[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
] [
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
and
Cj ≡
aσ2jσ
2
r
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du
)
Aj(τ)dτ +
aσ2jσ
2
β
2
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)
2du
)
Aj(τ)dτ
for j = r, β. The effect of a change in the demand intercept from θ0(τ) to θ0(τ) + ∆θ0(τ) on the yield y
(τ)
t for maturity τ is
∆y
(τ)
t ≡ ∆C(τ)τ , which from (41), (A.129) and (A.130) is
∆y
(τ)
t =
1
D
{[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ
] [
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
−
[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ
] [
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]} ∫ τ
0 Ar(u)du
τ
+
1
D
{[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ
] [
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
−
[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ
] [
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]} ∫ τ
0 Aβ(u)du
τ
.(A.131)
Hence, the change ∆θ0(τ) affects yields only through
∫∞
0 ∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ and
∫∞
0 ∆θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ .
When the change ∆θ0(τ) is a Dirac function with point mass at τ∗,∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aj(τ)dτ = Aj(τ
∗)
for j = r, β, and (A.131) becomes
(A.132) ∆y
(τ)
t,τ∗ =
1
D
[
Λr(τ
∗)
∫ τ
0 Ar(u)du
τ
+ Λβ(τ
∗)
∫ τ
0 Aβ(u)du
τ
]
,
where
Λr(τ
∗) ≡ aσ2rAr(τ∗)
[
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
− aσ2βAβ(τ∗)
[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
,
Λβ(τ
∗) ≡ aσ2βAβ(τ∗)
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
− aσ2rAr(τ∗)
[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
.
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Using (A.132), we can write (44) in the equivalent form[
Λr(τ1)
∫ τ1
0 Ar(u)du
τ1
+ Λβ(τ1)
∫ τ1
0 Aβ(u)du
τ1
][
Λr(τ2)
∫ τ2
0 Ar(u)du
τ2
+ Λβ(τ2)
∫ τ2
0 Aβ(u)du
τ2
]
>
[
Λr(τ1)
∫ τ2
0 Ar(u)du
τ2
+ Λβ(τ1)
∫ τ2
0 Aβ(u)du
τ2
][
Λr(τ2)
∫ τ1
0 Ar(u)du
τ1
+ Λβ(τ2)
∫ τ1
0 Aβ(u)du
τ1
]
⇔ [Λr(τ1)Λβ(τ2)− Λr(τ2)Λβ(τ1)]
[∫ τ1
0 Ar(u)du
τ1
∫ τ2
0 Aβ(u)du
τ2
−
∫ τ2
0 Ar(u)du
τ2
∫ τ1
0 Aβ(u)du
τ1
]
> 0.(A.133)
To show that (A.133) holds, we show that each of the two terms in brackets is positive. The second term is positive because it
has the same sign as∫ τ1
0
Ar(u)du
∫ τ2
0
Aβ(u)du−
∫ τ2
0
Ar(u)du
∫ τ1
0
Aβ(u)du
=
∫ τ1
0
Ar(u)du
∫ τ2
τ1
Aβ(u)du−
∫ τ2
τ1
Ar(u)du
∫ τ1
0
Aβ(u)du
>
∫ τ1
0
[
Aβ(u)
Ar(τ1)
Aβ(τ1)
]
du
∫ τ2
τ1
Aβ(u)du−
∫ τ2
τ1
[
Aβ(u)
Ar(τ1)
Aβ(τ1)
]
du
∫ τ1
0
Aβ(u)du = 0,
where the second step follows because Aβ(τ) > 0 and
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
< 0 for τ ∈ (0, τˆ). The first term is equal to
[
Ar(τ1)Aβ(τ2)−Ar(τ2)Aβ(τ1)
]
D,
and is positive if D > 0 since Aβ(τ) > 0 and
[
Ar(τ)
Aβ(τ)
]′
< 0 for τ ∈ (0, τˆ). Integration by parts implies that for j = r, β,∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)
Aj(τ)dτ
=
[
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)2]∞
0
+
∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)2
dαˆ(τ)−
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)
Aj(τ)dτ,(A.134)
where dαˆ(τ) denotes the measure generated by the non-decreasing function −α(τ) (which is possibly discontinuous at a finite
threshold T ). Since
[
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)2]∞
0
= lim
τ→∞
[
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)2]
= 0,
where the second step follows because M is finite, (A.134) implies
(A.135)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aj(u)du
)
Aj(τ)dτ =
∫∞
0
(∫ τ
0 Aj(u)du
)2
dαˆ(τ)
2
≥ 0,
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Likewise, ∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ +
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
= 2
[
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)]∞
0
+ 2
∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
dαˆ(τ)
−
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ −
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
⇒
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ +
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
=
∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
dαˆ(τ),
and hence [∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
] [∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
≤
[∫∞
0
(∫ τ
0 Ar(u)du
) (∫ τ
0 Aβ(u)du
)
dαˆ(τ)
]2
4
.(A.136)
Equations (A.135) and (A.136) imply that D > 0 if[∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)2
dαˆ(τ)
][∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)2
dαˆ(τ)
]
≥
[∫ ∞
0
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du
)(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du
)
dαˆ(τ)
]2
,
which holds because of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: DEMAND OF PREFERRED-HABITAT INVESTORS
There are overlapping generations of preferred-habitat investors living for a period of length T <∞, and of arbitrageurs living
for a period of length dt. Thus, at each point in time there is a continuum of investor generations and one arbitrageur generation.
Arbitrageurs and investors receive endowment W at the beginning of their life and consume at the end of their life. Arbitrageurs
use their endowment to buy bonds. Investors use their endowment to buy bonds and to invest in a private opportunity (“real
estate”) that pays at the end of their life. To ensure that the slope of the investors’ demand for bonds is finite, we require that
substitution between bonds and the private opportunity is imperfect. We model imperfect substitution by assuming that bonds
pay in a good 1 (“money”) and the private opportunity pays in a different good 2 (“real estate services”). The endowment W
is in good 1. Arbitrageurs and investors can use good 1 to invest in bonds and in the private opportunity.
Consider the optimization problem of an investor n born at time 0. We denote by Zˆ
(τ)
n,t the number of units of the bond
with maturity τ that the investor holds at time t ∈ [0, T ], where one unit of the bond is an investment in the bond with face
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value one. We denote by Wn,t the value of the investor’s bond portfolio at time t and by dcn,t the investment in the private
opportunity between t and t+dt, both expressed in units of good 1. We denote by (Wˆn,t, dcˆn,t) the counterparts of (Wn,t, dcn,t)
when expressed in units of the bond maturing at time T :
Wˆn,t ≡ Wn,t
P
(T−t)
t
,
dcˆn,t ≡ dcn,t
P
(T−t)
t
.
We finally denote by βˆ
(T−t)
n,t > 0 the number of units of good 2 that an investment of one unit of good 1 at time t yields at time
T . The investor’s budget constraint is
(B.1) dWˆn,t =
∫ T
0
Zˆ
(τ)
n,td
(
P
(τ)
t
P
(T−t)
t
)
dτ − dcˆn,t.
The investor’s utility at time T is
(B.2) u(CT ) +
∫ T
0
βˆ
(T−t)
n,t P
(T−t)
t dcˆn,t,
and consists of two parts: a utility u(CT ) that is an increasing and concave function of the consumption CT of good 1 at time T ,
and a utility
∫ T
0 βˆ
(T−t)
n,t P
(T−t)
t dcˆn,t that is equal to the consumption of good 2 at time T and is derived from the accumulated
investment in the private opportunity between times 0 and T . The marginal utility u′(CT ) converges to infinity when CT goes
to a lower bound C and to zero when CT goes to infinity. The investor has max-min preferences. At each time t ∈ [0, T ], the
investor chooses (Zˆ
(τ)
n,t , cˆn,t) to maximize the minimum of (B.2) over sample paths of qt = (rt, β1,t, .., βK,t)
> and βˆ(T−t)n,t , subject
to the budget constraint (B.1) and the terminal condition CT = WˆT .
Proposition B.1 Assume that Σ has full rank, K ≥ 1, βˆ(T−t)n,t is an invertible function of (β1,t, .., βK,t)>, and the term
structure involves no arbitrage, i.e., (34) holds. At time t, the investor holds only the bond maturing at time T and no other
bonds. The number Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t of units of the bond held by the investor solves
(B.3) u′
(
Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t
)
= P
(T−t)
t βˆ
(T−t)
n,t .
Proof: Defining (µZˆ,n,t, σZˆ,n,t) by
∫ T
0
Zˆ
(τ)
n,td
(
P
(τ)
t
P
(T−t)
t
)
dτ ≡ µZˆ,n,tdt+ σZˆ,n,tdBt,
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where dBt = (dBr,t, dBβ,1,t, .., dBβ,K,t)
>, we write the budget constraint (B.1) as
(B.4) dWˆn,t = µZˆ,n,tdt+ σZˆ,n,tdBt − dcˆn,t.
Integrating (B.4) from 0 to T and using the terminal condition CT = WˆT , we write the investor’s optimization problem at t = 0
as
max
Zˆ
(τ)
n,t ,cˆn,t
min
qt,βˆ
(T−t)
n,t
[
u
(
Wˆ0 +
∫ T
0
µZˆ,n,tdt+
∫ T
0
σZˆ,n,tdBt −∆cˆ0,n −
∫ T
0
dcˆn,t
)
+βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 ∆cˆn,t +
∫ T
0
βˆ
(T−t)
n,t P
(T−t)
t dcˆn,t
]
,(B.5)
where we allow for the possibility that cˆt has a discrete change ∆cˆn,0 at t = 0. Since Σ has full rank and K ≥ 1, rt is not
perfectly correlated with (β1,t, .., βK,t). Since, in addition, βˆ
(T−t)
n,t is an invertible function of (β1,t, .., βK,t), sample paths of qt
and βˆ
(T−t)
n,t exist such that βˆ
(T−t)
n,t P
(T−t)
t = u
′
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0
)
for t >  and for any  > 0. Hence, the minimum in (B.5) is smaller
than
min
qt,βˆ
(T−t)
n,t
[
u
(
Wˆ0 +
∫ T
0
µZˆ,n,tdt+
∫ T
0
σZˆ,n,tdBt −∆cˆ0,n −
∫ T
0
dcˆn,t
)
+βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 ∆cˆ0,n + u
′
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0
)∫ T
0
dcˆn,t
]
,
which in turn is smaller than
(B.6) min
qt,βˆ
(T−t)
n,t
[
u
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0
)
+ u′
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0
)(∫ T
0
µZˆ,n,tdt+
∫ T
0
σZˆ,n,tdBt
)
+ βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 ∆cˆ0,n
]
because u is concave. If σZˆ,n,t 6= 0 for any interval in (0, T ), then the minimum in (B.6) is minus infinity because the Brownian
motion has infinite variation. Therefore, σZˆ,n,t = 0, i.e., the investor holds the bond maturing at time T and zero units of all
other bonds. Since absence of arbitrage requires µZˆ,n,t = 0, (B.6) is smaller than
u
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0
)
+ βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 ∆cˆ0,n,
and hence
max
Zˆ
(τ)
n,t ,cˆn,t
min
qt,βˆ
(T−t)
n,t
[
u
(
Wˆ0 +
∫ T
0
µZˆ,n,tdt+
∫ T
0
σZˆ,n,tdBt −∆cˆ0,n −
∫ T
0
dcˆn,t
)
+βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 ∆cˆn,t +
∫ T
0
βˆ
(T−t)
n,t P
(T−t)
t dcˆn,t
]
≤ max
∆cˆ0,n
[
u
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0
)
+ βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 ∆cˆ0,n
]
.(B.7)
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Setting Zˆ
(τ)
n,t = 0 for t ≥ 0 and τ 6= T − t, and dcˆn,t = 0 for t > 0, in (B.5), we find that (B.7) holds also in the reverse sense,
and is therefore an equality. The optimal ∆cˆ0,n thus satisfies
(B.8) u′
(
Wˆ0 −∆cˆ0,n
)
= βˆ
(T )
0,nP
(T )
0 .
Since Wˆ0−∆cˆ0,n represents units of the bond maturing at time T that the investor holds at time 0, (B.8) yields (B.3) for t = 0.
The same argument yields (B.3) for t > 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition B.1 implies that preferred-habitat investors demand only the bond whose maturity coincides with the time when
they consume. To ensure that the demand by preferred-habitat investors takes the specific functional form (5)-(7), we assume
specific functions for the utility u and the return βˆ
(τ)
n,t on the private opportunity.
Suppose C = −∞, u(CT ) = −e−CT and βˆ(τ)n,t = eβ
(τ)
t , where β
(τ)
t is given by (6) and (7). Proposition B.1 implies that the
number Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t of units of the bond maturing at time T and held at time t by an investor born at time 0 is given by
e
−Zˆ(T−t)n,t = P (T−t)t βˆ
(T−t)
n,t ⇔ Zˆ(T−t)n,t = − log
(
P
(T−t)
t
)
− β(T−t)t .
This coincides with the demand (5)-(7) with α(τ) = 1, except that (5)-(7) concern the present value of the bond rather than its
face value, i.e., the units of the bond. To derive the demand (5)-(7) expressed in present-value terms, we modify the assumed
functions for u and βˆ
(τ)
n,t . We can obtain the demand (5)-(7) for a set of values of qt whose probability can be made arbitrarily
close to one.
Suppose that there are two types of preferred-habitat investors born at each time t, in equal measure. For type 1 investors,
C = 0, u(Ct+T ) = log(Ct+T ) and βˆ
(T+t−t′)
n,t′ = − 1min{β(T+t−t′)
t′ ,−}
, where β
(τ)
t is given by (6) and (7), and  is positive and
small. For type 2 investors, C = −∞ and βˆ(T+t−t′)
n,t′ = 1. To define u(Ct+T ) for type 2 investors, we start with the function
N(x) ≡ − log(x)
x
,
defined for x > 0. The function N(x) converges to infinity when x goes to zero, and to zero when x goes to infinity. It decreases
for x ∈ (0, e), and increases for x ∈ (e, T ). Its minimum value, obtained for x = e, is − 1
e
. We take x to represent marginal utility
u′(Ct+T ), and N(x) to represent Ct+T . This defines u(Ct+T ) for Ct+T > − 1e and u′(Ct+T ) ∈ (0, e). To define u(Ct+T ) for
Ct+T < − 1e and u′(Ct+T ) > e, we extend u′(Ct+T ) as a linear function of Ct. (Other extensions are possible as well.) We set
the derivative of the linear function so that u′(Ct+T ) is continuously differentiable at the extension point, and take the extension
A PREFERRED-HABITAT MODEL OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 85
point to be u′(Ct+T ) = e(1− ) (rather than u′(Ct+T ) = e) so that the derivative is finite. We thus set
u′(Ct+T ) = N−1(Ct+T ) for Ct+T ≥ N [e(1− )],
u′(Ct+T ) = e(1− )− e
2(1− )2
log(1− ) [Ct+T −N [e(1− )]] for Ct+T < N [e(1− )].
Since u′(Ct+T ) is positive and decreasing, u(Ct+T ) is increasing and concave.
Proposition B.1 implies that the number Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t of units of the bond maturing at time T and held at time t by a type 1
investor born at time 0 is given by
1
Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t
= P
(T−t)
t βˆ
(T−t)
n,t .
This yields the demand
P
(T−t)
t Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t =
1
βˆ
(T−t)
n,t
= −β(T−t)t ,
expressed in present-value terms, when β
(T−t)
t < −. Proposition B.1 implies that the number Zˆ(T−t)n,t of units of the bond
maturing at time T and held at time t by a type 2 investor born at time 0 is given by
N−1
(
Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t
)
= P
(T−t)
t
when P
(T−t)
t < e(1− ). This yields the demand
P
(T−t)
t Zˆ
(T−t)
n,t = P
(T−t)
t N
(
P
(T−t)
t
)
= − log
(
P
(T−t)
t
)
,
expressed in present-value terms. The aggregate demand, expressed in present-value terms, across type 1 and type 2 investors
when β
(T−t)
t < − and P (T−t)t < e(1− ) is
− log
(
P
(T−t)
t
)
− β(T−t)t
and coincides with the demand (5)-(7) with α(τ) = 1. Condition β
(T−t)
t < − requires that the demand intercept in (5) is
negative (smaller than −). Condition P (T−t)t < e(1− ) requires that zero-coupon bonds trade below e(1− ) and hence below
par value. The probability of the set of values of qt such that the two conditions hold simultaneously can be made arbitrarily
close to one if r is sufficiently large and θ0(τ) sufficiently small.
Proposition B.1 and the subsequent analysis require K ≥ 1. To extend them to K = 0, we assume that βˆ(T−t)n,t is equal to a
deterministic function of T − t plus random noise that is independent across investors n in the same generation. Because of the
random noise, βˆ
(T−t)
n,t is not perfectly correlated with rt, and the proof of Proposition B.1 goes through. Because the random
noise is independent across investors in the same generation, βˆ
(T−t)
n,t averages to a deterministic function of T − t.
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APPENDIX C: CALIBRATION
C.1. Model-Generated Moments
Equations (1) and (30) imply that when there is one demand factor, the yield for maturity τ is
y
(τ)
t =
Ar(τ)rt +Aβ(τ)βt + C(τ)
τ
.
When, in addition, the demand factor is independent of the short rate, the volatility of the yield is
(C.1)
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
=
√
Ar(τ)2Var(rt) +Aβ(τ)2Var(βt)
τ
=
√
Ar(τ)2
σ2r
2κr
+Aβ(τ)2
σ2
β
2κβ
τ
.
The volatility of yield changes during an interval of length ∆τ is√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+∆τ − y
(τ)
t
)
=
√
Ar(τ)2Var(rt+∆τ − rt) +Aβ(τ)2Var(βt+∆τ − βt)
τ
=
√
Ar(τ)2
σ2r
κr
(1− e−κr∆τ ) +Aβ(τ)2
σ2
β
κβ
(1− e−κβ∆τ )
τ
,(C.2)
where the second step follows from (A.7) and its counterpart equation for βt. The covariance of yield changes is
Cov
(
y
(τ1)
t+∆τ − y
(τ1)
t , y
(τ2)
t+∆τ − y
(τ2)
t
)
=
Ar(τ1)Ar(τ2)Var(rt+∆τ − rt) +Aβ(τ1)Aβ(τ2)Var(βt+∆τ − βt)
τ
=
Ar(τ1)Ar(τ2)
σ2r
κr
(1− e−κr∆τ ) +Aβ(τ1)Aβ(τ2)
σ2β
κβ
(1− e−κβ∆τ )
τ
.(C.3)
The correlation of yield changes can be computed from (C.2) and (C.3). The principal components can be computed from the
covariance matrix of yield changes, with element (τ1, τ2) given by (C.3). The FB and CS regression coefficients are given by
(A.115) and (A.122), respectively.
The volume during an infinitesimal interval [t, t+dt] for the bond with maturity τ ∈ (0, T ) is the absolute value of the change
dZ
(τ)
t in the demand of preferred-habitat investors. The change dZ
(τ)
t is
dZ
(τ)
t = −d
{
α(τ) log(P
(τ)
t ) + β
(τ)
t
}
= d
{
α(τ)
[
Ar(τ)rt +Aβ(τ)βt + C(τ)
]− [θ0(τ) + θ(τ)βt]} ,(C.4)
where the first step follows from (5), and the second from (6) and (30) written for one demand factor. Equation (C.4) implies
that expected volume is
E
(∣∣∣dZ(τ)t ∣∣∣) = E [Et (∣∣∣dZ(τ)t ∣∣∣)] = E
[√
2
pi
Vart
(
dZ
(τ)
t
)]
= E
[√
2
pi
V (τ)dt
]
=
√
2
pi
V (τ)dt,
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where independence between the short rate and demand implies
V (τ) ≡ α(τ)2Ar(τ)2σ2r +
[
α(τ)Aβ(τ)− θ(τ)
]2
σ2β
= αe−2δατAr(τ)2σ2r +
[
αe−δατAβ(τ)− θ
(
e−δατ − e−δθτ
)]2
σ2β .
In our calculations of relative volume we use
√
V (τ), which is proportional to expected volume.
When yields across all maturities change by ∆y, (1) and (5) imply that the demand of preferred-habitat investors changes by
∆y
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)τdτ = α∆y
∫ ∞
0
e−δατ τdτ = α∆y
1− e−δαT − δαTe−δαT
δ2α
.
Setting (T, δα,∆y) = (30, 0.297, 0.0001) and the demand change to 0.0059, we find α = 5.21.
C.2. Calibrated Parameters
Tables C.I and C.II report the calibrated parameters and the empirical moments used to determine them, for the sub-sample
of nominal yields and the sample of real yields, respectively.
C.3. Elasticities
The matrix in the top panel of Table C.III reports the elasticities of the first seven model-generated moments in Table I
with respect to the first seven parameters, for the main sample of nominal yields. The elasticities are computed by varying each
parameter from its value in Table I times 1.001 to its value in Table I times 0.999, computing the change in the corresponding
model-generated moment, dividing by the value of that moment in the base case, and multiplying by 500.
The elasticities involving (δα, δθ) are hard to interpret because they combine multiple effects. For example, an increase in
δθ lowers the relative volume for long maturities. It also strengthens the effect of demand shocks on yields, since the shocks’
magnitude is θ(τ) = θ
(
e−δατ − e−δθτ ), which increases in δθ. This raises the volatility of yields and lowers the correlation
between yield changes at short and long maturities.
To disentangle the effects and facilitate the interpretation of the elasticities, we modify the matrix in the top panel of Table
C.III by subtracting columns i = 4, 5 from columns j = 6, 7, after multiplying each time column i by the scalar needed to make
element (i, j) equal to zero. For i = 4, this amounts to keeping the volatility of annual yield changes constant when changing
(δα, δθ), through a compensating change in aθ. For i = 5, this amounts to keeping the correlation between annual changes to the
one-year yield and to other yields constant when changing (δα, δθ), through a compensating change in aα. Eliminating the effects
of (δα, δθ) on the volatility of yields and on the correlation between them results in the simpler matrix of modified elasticities
in the bottom panel of Table C.III. We focus on that matrix from now on.
The parameter κr has its strongest, negative, effect on the volatility of the one-year yield. The parameter σr has its strongest,
positive, effect on the volatility of the one-year yield and on the volatility of annual changes to that yield. Other parameters
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TABLE C.I
Calibration of model parameters for the sub-sample of nominal yields.
Parameter Value Empirical moment Value
κr
Mean-reversion of rt
0.240
√
Var
(
y
(1)
t
)
Volatility 1-year yield
– Levels
1.89
σr
Diffusion of rt
0.0159
√
Var
(
y
(1)
t+1 − y(1)t
)
Volatility 1-year yield
– Annual changes
1.24
κβ
Mean-reversion of βt
0.127
1
30
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
Volatility τ -year yield
– Levels, average over τ
1.36
aθ
Arb. risk-aversion× PH demand shock 5305
1
30
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+1 − y(τ)t
)
Volatility τ -year yield
– Annual changes, average over τ
0.705
aα
Arb. risk-aversion× PH demand slope 80.3
1
30
∑30
τ=1Corr
(
y
(1)
t+1 − y(1)t , y(τ)t+1 − y(τ)t
)
Correlation 1-year yield with τ -year yield
– Annual changes, average over τ
0.369
δα
PH demand shock
– short maturities
0.269
∑
0<τ≤2 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
Relative volume for maturities τ ∈ (0, 2]
0.199
δθ
PH demand shock
– long maturities
0.279
∑
11<τ≤30 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
Relative volume for maturities τ ∈ (11, 30]
0.094
α
PH demand slope 4.28 Estimate in KVJ 2012 -0.746
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TABLE C.II
Calibration of model parameters for the sample of real yields.
Parameter Value Empirical moment Value
κr
Mean-reversion of rt
0.395
√
Var
(
y
(2)
t
)
Volatility 2-year yield
– Levels
1.59
σr
Diffusion of rt
0.0216
√
Var
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t
)
Volatility 2-year yield
– Annual changes
1.23
κβ
Mean-reversion of βt
0.098
1
19
∑20
τ=2
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
Volatility τ -year yield
– Levels, average over τ
1.30
aθ
Arb. risk-aversion× PH demand shock 643
1
19
∑20
τ=2
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+1 − y(τ)t
)
Volatility τ -year yield
– Annual changes, average over τ
0.674
aα
Arb. risk-aversion× PH demand slope 44.5
1
19
∑20
τ=2Corr
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t , y(τ)t+1 − y(τ)t
)
Correlation 2-year yield with τ -year yield
– Annual changes, average over τ
0.660
δα
PH demand shock
– short maturities
0.265
∑
0<τ≤2 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
Relative volume for maturities τ ∈ (0, 2]
0.199
δθ
PH demand shock
– long maturities
0.308
∑
11<τ≤30 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
Relative volume for maturities τ ∈ (11, 30]
0.094
α
PH demand slope 4.16 Estimate in KVJ 2012 -0.746
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TABLE C.III
Elasticities and modified elasticities of model-generated moments with respect to model parameters for the
main sample of nominal yields.
Parameter κr σr κβ aθ aα δα δθ√
Var
(
y
(1)
t
)
-0.538 0.468 -0.006 0.017 -0.041 -0.448 0.500√
Var
(
y
(1)
t+1 − y(1)t
)
-0.074 0.467 -0.001 0.012 -0.039 -0.315 0.009
1
19
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
-0.318 0.344 -0.672 1.493 -0.903 -43.873 43.661
1
19
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+1 − y(τ)t
)
-0.202 0.330 -0.256 1.243 -0.791 -36.446 36.340
1
19
∑30
τ=1Corr
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t , y(τ)t+1 − y(τ)t
)
0.083 -0.207 0.225 -1.443 0.514 43.209 -42.273
∑
0<τ≤2 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
-0.019 0.179 -0.036 0.028 0.165 -0.379 1.192
∑
11<τ≤30 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
0.189 -0.365 0.236 -0.519 -0.106 15.304 -16.877
Parameter κr σr κβ aθ aα δα δθ√
Var
(
y
(1)
t
)
-0.538 0.468 -0.006 0.017 -0.041 -0.017 0.011√
Var
(
y
(1)
t+1 − y(1)t
)
-0.074 0.467 -0.001 0.012 -0.039 -0.018 0.009
1
19
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
-0.318 0.344 -0.672 1.493 -0.903 0.008 0.003
1
19
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+1 − y(τ)t
)
-0.202 0.330 -0.256 1.243 -0.791 0 0
1
19
∑30
τ=1Corr
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t , y(τ)t+1 − y(τ)t
)
0.083 -0.207 0.225 -1.443 0.514 0 0
∑
0<τ≤2 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
-0.019 0.179 -0.036 0.028 0.165 0.856 0.327
∑
11<τ≤30 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
0.189 -0.365 0.236 -0.519 -0.106 -0.875 -1.617
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have much weaker effects on these volatilities. Hence, the volatility of the one-year yield identifies κr, and the volatility of annual
changes to that yield identifies σr.
The parameter κβ has its strongest, negative, effect on the average volatility of yields. The parameters (aθ, aα) have their
strongest effects on the average volatility of yields, on the average volatility of annual yield changes, and on the average correlation
between annual changes to the one-year yield and to other yields. Hence, the average volatility of yields identifies κβ , and the
other two moments identify (aθ, aα).23
The parameters (δα, δθ) have their strongest effect on relative volume, positive for short maturities and negative for long
maturities. The effect of δθ on short-maturity volume is weaker. Hence, the relative volume for maturities two years and below
identifies δα, and the relative volume for maturities eleven years and above identifies δθ.
Tables C.IV and C.V provide counterpart matrices to that in the bottom panel of Table C.III, for the sub-sample of nominal
yields and the sample of real yields, respectively. The modified elasticities for these samples have similar magnitudes and signs
to those for the main sample of nominal yields.
C.4. Figures
Figures C.1 and C.2 compare the empirical moments to the model-generated ones, for the sub-sample of nominal yields and
the sample of real yields, respectively. For the sub-sample of nominal yields, the fraction of variation of annual yield changes
explained by the first principal component is 74% in the model and 73.8% in the data. For the sample of real yields, maturities
range from two to twenty. The one-year yield needed to compute the empirical FB and CS coefficients is obtained by spline
interpolation. The first principal component of annual yield changes is scaled to one for the two-year maturity. The fraction of
variation of annual yield changes explained by the first principal component is 83.6% in the model and 85.2% in the data.
C.5. Policy Analysis
Consider an unanticipated change ∆r in the long-run mean r of the short rate rt at time zero that reverts deterministically
to zero at the rate κr. Writing bond prices at time t as
P
(τ)
t = e
−[Ar(τ)rt+Aβ(τ)βt+Ar(τ)∆re−κrt+C(τ)]
and proceeding as in Sections 3 and 4, we find that Ar(τ) solves the ODE
A′r(τ) + κrAr(τ)− κrAr(τ) = −aσ2rAr(τ)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)Ar(τ)dτ − aσ2βAβ(τ)
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)Ar(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ.
23Table C.III shows that an increase in aα raises the correlation between yield changes at short and long maturities (element
(5,5) is positive). Intuitively, an increase in α, holding (a, θ) constant, weakens the transmission of short-rate shocks to longer
maturities, and this lowers correlation. At the same time, demand shocks have weaker effects on yields because shocks are better
absorbed when preferred-habitat demand has higher slope. The latter effect lowers volatility and raises correlation. The latter
effect also makes the mapping between aθ and volatility, and between aα and correlation, less clear-cut. To isolate the former
effect, we consider an increase in aα accompanied by an increase in aθ such that the volatility of annual yield changes remains
constant. (This amounts to subtracting column 4 from column 5, after multiplying column 4 by the scalar needed to make
element (4, 5) equal to zero.) Element (5, 5) then turns negative, capturing only the former effect.
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TABLE C.IV
Modified elasticities of model-generated moments with respect to model parameters for the sub-sample of
nominal yields.
Parameter κr σr κβ aθ aα δα δθ√
Var
(
y
(1)
t
)
-0.572 0.454 -0.007 0.025 -0.058 -0.063 0.065√
Var
(
y
(1)
t+1 − y(1)t
)
-0.137 0.454 -0.001 0.021 -0.057 -0.062 0.061
1
19
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
-0.195 0.191 -0.924 2.054 -1.335 0.009 -0.001
1
19
∑30
τ=1
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+1 − y(τ)t
)
-0.122 0.198 -0.507 1.898 -1.251 0 0
1
19
∑30
τ=1Corr
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t , y(τ)t+1 − y(τ)t
)
0.157 -0.142 0.406 -2.145 0.930 0 0
∑
0<τ≤2 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
-0.045 0.225 -0.107 0.134 0.158 0.938 -0.008
∑
11<τ≤30 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
0.269 -0.362 0.767 -1.626 0.451 -0.724 -1.143
TABLE C.V
Modified elasticities of model-generated moments with respect to model parameters for the sample of real
yields.
Parameter κr σr κβ aθ aα δα δθ√
Var
(
y
(2)
t
)
-0.627 0.460 -0.012 0.028 -0.054 -0.027 0.026√
Var
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t
)
-0.230 0.459 -0.001 0.016 -0.049 -0.028 0.020
1
19
∑20
τ=2
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t
)
-0.455 0.362 -0.911 1.903 -1.090 0.012 0.003
1
19
∑20
τ=2
√
Var
(
y
(τ)
t+1 − y(τ)t
)
-0.386 0.352 -0.427 1.536 -0.916 0 0
1
19
∑20
τ=2Corr
(
y
(2)
t+1 − y(2)t , y(τ)t+1 − y(τ)t
)
0.129 -0.153 0.377 -1.671 0.683 0 0
∑
0<τ≤2 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
-0.094 0.241 -0.084 0.022 0.230 0.838 0.176
∑
11<τ≤30 Volume(τ)∑
0<τ≤30 Volume(τ)
0.457 -0.422 0.514 -0.945 0.051 -0.823 -1.458
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Figure C.1.— Model-generated and empirical moments for the sub-sample of nominal yields.
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Figure C.2.— Model-generated and empirical moments for the sample of real yields.
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Proceeding as in the proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 7, we find that the solution to the ODE is
Ar(τ) = χr
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du+ χβ
∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du,
where
χr ≡ κr
D
[
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
,
χβ ≡ −
κr
D
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ,
and
D ≡
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
×
[
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
−
[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
×
[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κr(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
.
When a = 0, (χr, χβ , Ar(τ), Aβ(τ)) = (κr, 0,
1−e−κrτ
κr
, 0) and
Ar(τ) =
∫ τ
0
(
1− e−κru) e−κr(τ−u)du.
Figures C.3 and C.4 show the effects of a forward-guidance announcement about the path of short rates, for the calibrations
based on the sub-sample of nominal yields and the sample of real yields, respectively. In each panel, the red solid line represents
the announcement’s effect on the term structure, and the red dashed line represents the same effect when arbitrageurs are
risk-neutral and the EH holds. The change ∆r in the long-run mean r of the short rate rt is set to -4 (-400 bps). It reverts to
zero at the rate κr = 0.1 in the left panel and κr = 0.2 in the right panel.
Consider next an unanticipated change ∆θ0(τ) in the intercept of preferred-habitat demand at time zero that reverts deter-
ministically to zero at the rate κθ. Writing bond prices at time t as
P
(τ)
t = e
−[Ar(τ)rt+Aβ(τ)βt+Aθ(τ)∆θ0(τ)e−κθt+C(τ)]
and proceeding as in Sections 3 and 4, we find that Aθ(τ) solves the ODE
A′θ(τ) + κθAθ(τ) = aσ
2
rAr(τ)
∫ ∞
0
[∆θ0(τ)− α(τ)Aθ(τ)]Ar(τ)dτ + aσ2βAβ(τ)
∫ ∞
0
[∆θ0(τ)− α(τ)Aθ(τ)]Aβ(τ)dτ.
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Figure C.3.— Effect of a forward-guidance announcement about the path of short rates, for the calibration
based on the sub-sample of nominal yields.
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Figure C.4.— Effect of a forward-guidance announcement about the path of short rates, for the calibration
based on the sample of real yields.
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Proceeding as in the proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 7, we find that the solution to the ODE is
Aθ(τ) = χr
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du+ χβ
∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du,
where
χr ≡ 1
D
{
aσ2r
[∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ
] [
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
−aσ2β
[∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ
] [
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]}
,
χβ ≡
1
D
{
aσ2β
[∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aβ(τ)dτ
] [
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
−aσ2r
[∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Ar(τ)dτ
] [
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]}
,
and
D ≡
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
×
[
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
−
[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
×
[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
.
When the change ∆θ0(τ) is a Dirac function with point mass at τ∗,
∫ ∞
0
∆θ0(τ)Aj(τ)dτ = Aj(τ
∗)
for j = r, β. Hence, the time-zero change in the yield for maturity τ is
(C.5) ∆y
(τ)
t,τ∗ =
1
D
[
Λr(τ
∗)
∫ τ
0 Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
τ
+ Λβ(τ
∗)
∫ τ
0 Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
τ
]
,
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Figure C.5.— Effect of QE, for the calibration based on the sub-sample of nominal yields.
where
Λr(τ
∗) ≡ aσ2rAr(τ∗)
[
1 + aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
− aσ2βAβ(τ∗)
[
aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
,
Λβ(τ
∗) ≡ aσ2βAβ(τ∗)
[
1 + aσ2r
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Ar(τ)dτ
]
− aσ2rAr(τ∗)
[
aσ2β
∫ ∞
0
α(τ)
(∫ τ
0
Ar(u)e
−κθ(τ−u)du
)
Aβ(τ)dτ
]
.
Figures C.5 and C.6 show the effects of QE for the calibrations based on the sub-sample of nominal yields and the sample
of real yields, respectively. In each panel, the red, green, light blue (cyan), blue and black solid lines represent the effect of
QE purchases of two-, five-, ten-, twenty- and thirty-year bonds, respectively. The black dashed line represents the effect of QE
purchases that conform to the maturity distribution used by the Fed during QE1, as reported in D’Amico and King (2013). In
all cases, the change ∆θ0(τ) in the intercept of preferred-habitat demand is such that
∫∞
0 ∆θ0(τ)dτ = −0.12, i.e., QE purchases
are 12% of GDP. QE is unwound at the rate κr = 0.1 in the left panel and κr = 0.2 in the right panel. We use the value of a
that generates the average effect across the lower and the upper bound. These bounds are a = 18.8 and a = 93.8, respectively,
in Figure C.5, and a = 10.7 and a = 53.5, respectively, in Figure C.6.
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Figure C.6.— Effect of QE, for the calibration based on the sample of real yields.
C.6. Unconditional Moments
The expected excess return of the bond with maturity τ is equal to the right-hand side of (35). When there is one demand
factor which is independent of the short rate, the right-hand side of (35) becomes
aσ2rAr(τ)
∫ ∞
0
[
θ0(τ) + θ(τ)βt − α(τ)
(
Ar(τ)rt +Aβ(τ)βt + C(τ)
)]
Ar(τ)dτ
+ aσ2rAβ(τ)
∫ ∞
0
[
θ0(τ) + θ(τ)βt − α(τ)
(
Ar(τ)rt +Aβ(τ)βt + C(τ)
)]
Aβ(τ)dτ.
Taking expectations with respect to (rt, βt), we find that the unconditional expected excess return is
(C.6) aσ2rAr(τ)Mr + aσ
2
βAβ(τ)Mβ ,
where
Mr ≡
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ) (Ar(τ)r + C(τ))]Ar(τ)dτ,
Mβ ≡
∫ ∞
0
[θ0(τ)− α(τ) (Ar(τ)r + C(τ))]Aβ(τ)dτ.
The Sharpe ratio of the bond with maturity τ is
aσ2rAr(τ)Mr + aσ
2
βAβ(τ)Mβ√
σ2rAr(τ)
2 + σ2βAβ(τ)
2
.
The correlation between the return on the bond with maturity τ and the stochastic discount factor is
σ2rAr(τ)Mr + σ
2
βAβ(τ)Mβ√
σ2rAr(τ)
2 + σ2βAβ(τ)
2
√
σ2rM
2
r + σ
2
βM
2
β
.
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The stochastic discount factor parameters (Mr,Mβ) depend on C(τ). When there is one demand factor which is independent of
the short rate, (41) becomes
C(τ) = χr
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)du+ χβ
∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)du−
1
2
(
σ2r
∫ τ
0
Ar(u)
2du+ σ2β
∫ τ
0
Aβ(u)
2du
)
.
The constants (χr, χβ) are given by (A.129) and (A.130).
